Fordham Law Review
Volume 86

Issue 1

Article 13

2017

Reviving Reliance
Ann M. Lipton
Tulane Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Civil Law Commons, Common Law Commons,
Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 91 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

REVIVING RELIANCE
Ann M. Lipton*
This Article explores the misalignment between the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws and the private causes of action
available to investors to enforce those requirements.
Historically, federally mandated disclosures were designed to allow
investors to set an appropriate price for publicly traded securities. Today’s
disclosures, however, also enable stockholders to participate in corporate
governance and act as a check on managerial misbehavior. To enforce these
requirements, investors’ chief option is a claim under the general antifraud
statute, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. But courts are
deeply suspicious of investors’ attempts to use the Act to hold corporations
liable for false statements related to governance.
As this Article demonstrates, judicial skepticism can be traced to the
functional elimination of the element of reliance from private investors’
claims. Without the element of reliance, courts cannot discriminate between
deception, which section 10(b) prohibits, and poor managerial decisionmaking, to which section 10(b) does not speak. Doctrines that courts
developed to distinguish between the two now have the perverse effect of
devaluing disclosures intended to facilitate shareholder participation in
corporate governance. More troublingly, they enforce a normative viewpoint
that shareholders do not, or should not, have interests beyond the short-term
maximization of a firm’s stock price. This interpretation of shareholder
preferences undermines modern regulatory initiatives that employ
shareholders as a restraining force on antisocial corporate conduct.
This Article proposes that courts adopt new interpretations of section
10(b) that reestablish the centrality of reliance. By doing so, courts can
facilitate shareholders’ participation in the corporate governance structure
and reward investors who inhabit the role of corporate monitor.
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invaluable research assistance of Alex Beverly and Sheridan King.

91

92

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 92
I. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE DIVISION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW .............................................. 96
A. Disclosure Versus Substance: How States and the Federal
Government Have Traditionally Allocated Responsibilities
for Protecting Investors ............................................................ 96
B. Private Enforcement Is Oriented Toward Disclosure for
Purposes of Valuation ............................................................... 98
II. DISCLOSURE’S EVOLUTION: FROM VALUATION TO GOVERNANCE ... 103
III. JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE NEW
DISCLOSURE REGIME ..................................................................... 109
A. Federal Law Contains No Cause of Action Designed to
Enforce Governance-Related Disclosures .............................. 109
B. Section 10(b) as an Alternative Option..................................... 110
1. Puffery ............................................................................... 112
2. Loss Causation and Damages ............................................ 116
3. Omissions Liability ............................................................ 123
IV. SHAREHOLDER PREFERENCES AS IMPOSED BY THE JUDICIARY ......... 125
A. Shareholders: Victims or Enablers? ........................................ 126
B. A Perfect Storm in Section 10(b) .............................................. 129
V. REVIVING RELIANCE ........................................................................... 136
A. Distinguishing Between Actual Reliance and Fraud-on-theMarket Claims......................................................................... 136
1. Redesigning Puffery........................................................... 140
2. Actual Reliance and Loss Causation .................................. 141
3. Actual Reliance and Omissions ......................................... 143
4. Claims for Securities Holders ............................................ 144
B. Imagining a Governance Right of Action ................................. 145
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 146
INTRODUCTION
The federal securities laws mandate that publicly traded businesses
disclose material information to investors, and private litigation has long
served as a critical mechanism for their enforcement. Today, however, the
required disclosures have outgrown the private causes of action, making it
easier for businesses to evade their legal responsibilities. Investors’ ability
to monitor and influence corporate behavior suffers as a result.
For many years, federally mandated disclosures were designed primarily
to enable investors to set appropriate prices for publically traded securities.
Investors were provided with basic information about the corporation’s
assets, revenues, liabilities, capital structure, and the like for the purpose of
allowing them to price the securities they traded. In this manner, federal law
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treated investors like consumers purchasing a corporate product, positioned
as opposite and external to the corporate entity.
Over time, however, investors changed, and the purposes of disclosure
changed with them. In the mid-twentieth century, most stock was held by
individual retail investors. Today, by contrast, 66 percent of publicly traded
stock is held by institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds,
hedge funds, and insurance companies.1 These investors often have a
And unlike the dispersed,
substantial stake in particular firms.2
unsophisticated retail investors of days past, institutional investors have the
expertise, the voting power, and the incentives to take a serious interest in the
way that corporations are managed and to advocate for changes when they
are dissatisfied with the current strategy. They no longer need to be treated
as counterparties to the corporate entity—instead they are, or have the
potential to be, participants in the corporate governance project.
Congress and federal regulators have responded to the shift. Though state
law has traditionally afforded few rights to stockholders—a state of affairs
that many have criticized for enabling managerial abuse3—federal law has
gradually increased stockholder power. Among other things, Congress and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have enhanced stockholder
voting rights, loosened restrictions on communications among stockholders,
and granted stockholders greater access to the corporate proxy. As part of
these efforts, regulators have expanded the types of information to be
disclosed to stockholders. No longer is the focus solely on valuation. Today,
many mandated disclosures concern the corporation’s internal decisionmaking processes and governance structures in order to facilitate greater
shareholder oversight.4 In this manner, federal law enables shareholders to
protect themselves against unfaithful or incompetent managers and provides
them with sufficient information to exercise a voice in corporate affairs. The
federal regulatory scheme, in other words, has begun to enlist shareholders
to serve as monitors of managerial behavior, and disclosure is one of its
critical tools.
Unfortunately, even though private litigation remains a significant part of
the regime for enforcing federal disclosure requirements, it has not adapted
to the changes. Currently, there is no cause of action designed to enforce
disclosures that are intended to assist shareholders’ involvement in corporate
governance. Instead, the only viable option is section 10(b) of the Securities
1. Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Institutional Investors and Stock Market
Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 7 (Aug. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147757
[https://perma.cc/3FF4WRTU]; see also Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Corporations and the 99%: Team Production
Revisited, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 163, 171–72 (2016) (reporting that in 1945, 93
percent of equity stock was held by individuals and that in 2014, the figure was closer to 36
percent).
2. For example, the Vanguard Group controls more than 5 percent of over 90 percent of
the companies that make up the Standard & Poor’s 500 index. Sarah Krouse et al., Passive
Funds Embrace Their New Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2016, at A1.
3. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
4. See infra Part I.
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Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).5 Section 10(b) is a general
antifraud statute, but it is narrowly aimed toward policing false statements in
the context of valuation during a purchase or sale.6
Even with its limitations, section 10(b) could be utilized as a backdoor
method for enforcing governance-related disclosures;7 however, over the
years, courts have built up a series of doctrines which prevent precisely that.8
For example, the doctrine of puffery—treating certain types of disclosures as
too vague to be material to investors—is often employed for the purpose of
rejecting claims based on statements relating to corporate governance
processes and quality.9 Additionally, section 10(b) damages are defined as
the difference between a security’s purchase price and its true value at the
time of purchase, disregarding how a continuing fraud may cause further
damage over time precisely because it denies shareholders the opportunity to
force an early course correction.10
Many of these doctrines can be traced to a particular development in
section 10(b) jurisprudence: the functional elimination of the element of
reliance.11 Reliance is a typical element in fraud claims, where it provides
the necessary causal connection between the defendant’s bad act and the
plaintiff’s injury.12 In the context of section 10(b), however, reliance has
largely been replaced with the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.13 That doctrine
requires that courts presume that false statements harm investors by distorting
the market price of a security, even when particular investors did not
personally know of, or make decisions based upon, the statement.14
By substituting a presumption of market disruption for individualized
proof that false statements influenced investors, courts made it far easier for
plaintiffs to bring claims and for claims to be aggregated into class actions.15
At the same time, the elimination of individualized reliance has made it more
difficult to distinguish between deception, which section 10(b) prohibits, and
poor managerial decision-making, to which section 10(b) does not speak.16
Courts developed alternative tools to draw a distinction between the two
types of allegations, but those tools now have the perverse effect of devaluing
disclosures intended to facilitate shareholder participation in corporate
governance.17
Courts’ interpretations of section 10(b) not only draw obsolete distinctions
between disclosure and governance, but, as this Article demonstrates, they

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part III.A–B.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
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are often used to enforce courts’ normative views of shareholder
preferences.18 Specifically, courts frequently assume that shareholders are
amoral, relatively short-term stakeholders with no interests beyond the
maximization of the stock price of the firm at issue. But this portrait of
shareholder preferences is factually inaccurate: shareholders frequently
favor a longer-term view and have interests beyond their investment in a
particular firm. More troublingly, it stands in opposition to the ethos of
modern regulatory initiatives that employ shareholders as a restraining force
on antisocial corporate conduct.19
This Article proposes that courts adopt new interpretations of section 10(b)
that draw more workable distinctions between governance and deception and,
crucially, reestablish the centrality of reliance. Though fraud on the market
continues to have an important role, courts should distinguish between actual
reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims in certain contexts. Doing so
would encourage investors to inhabit the role of corporate monitor, ultimately
benefitting other investors and society more broadly. Moreover, in today’s
deregulatory climate, the issue takes on a particular urgency: as government
authorities retrench, the role of investors in constraining corporate behavior
becomes especially critical.20
At the same time, this Article recognizes that reinterpreting section 10(b)
is only a partial fix, as the statute remains immutably focused on the
transactional role of investors rather than the governing role. Today’s
investors often adopt passive strategies, purchasing and selling based on
broad indices rather than individual company characteristics.21 These
investors do take corporate disclosures into account, but at a different stage:
when determining how to vote or engage with management. To fully
empower these investors, then, enforcement mechanisms must be tailored to
their role in the corporate structure.
Part I begins by describing the traditional division of labor between states
and the federal government in the regulation of corporations. States are
generally responsible for delineating the substantive rights of investors
within the corporate structure and the duties owed by managers. Federal law
has focused on disclosure, which is chiefly intended to allow investors to
value securities in the context of trading. Next, Part II establishes that the
purposes of federal disclosure requirements have expanded to encourage
investors—particularly institutional investors—to participate in corporate
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Emily Chasan, State Street Asks Boards to Disclose More on Climate Preparation,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/statestreet-asks-boards-to-disclose-more-on-climate-preparation
[https://perma.cc/MKH9M5LW]; Andrea Vittorio, Shareholder Advocacy on Climate Change Won’t Let Up,
Bloomberg BNA (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.bna.com/shareholder-advocacy-climaten73014449052/ [https://perma.cc/L725-LR66] (reporting that investors will advocate for
corporate action on climate change even if the federal government no longer prioritizes the
issue).
21. Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-business-of-picking-stocks1476714749?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/EH59-HUZG].
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governance, with a view toward enabling them to act as monitors of
management behavior.
Part III demonstrates how judicial interpretations of the private right of
action under section 10(b) interfere with these disclosure requirements and
devalue the role that investors occupy in the governance structure. Then, Part
IV shows that these interpretations are not neutral but instead inscribe into
doctrine a particular vision of shareholder values and priorities that is at odds
with the evolving federal regulatory scheme. Finally, Part V proposes
changes to harmonize judicial doctrine with the modern regulatory scheme.
I. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND THE
DIVISION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW
The relationships among corporations, their officers and directors, and
their investors are subject to regulation at the state and federal levels.22
Corporations are created by state law, and state law defines the substantive
terms of their existence; federal law, at least historically, has been primarily
concerned with ensuring that investors receive sufficient information about
the companies in which they invest. This Part describes the traditional
division of regulatory labor between the states and the federal government
and the purposes of the federal disclosure requirements.
A. Disclosure Versus Substance: How States and the
Federal Government Have Traditionally Allocated
Responsibilities for Protecting Investors
Corporations are generally chartered in the first instance by states, and
state law, historically, has been responsible for regulating the legal
requirements of the corporate form. Thus, state law determines how power
is allocated between stockholders and managers and delineates the matters fit
for stockholder action, the duties owed by managers to the corporation and
its stockholders, and the mechanisms by which stockholders can enforce their
rights.23
Pursuant to this authority, states have chosen to grant most management
powers to the corporate directors, with stockholder powers kept—at least as
a formal matter—quite minimal.24 In general, the remedy under state law for
shareholders disenchanted with management is to sell their shares, commonly
referred to as the “Wall Street Walk.”25 Though state law grants shareholders
22. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The
SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001); James J. Park,
Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116
(2017); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003).
23. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89–91 (1987).
24. In most states, there are significant barriers—if not outright prohibitions—on
shareholders taking such actions as calling special meetings, initiating major transactions, or
proposing director candidates. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 574 (2003).
25. See generally Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The “Wall Street Walk” and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645 (2009).
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certain rights to sue for corporate mismanagement that rises to the level of
open self-dealing and willful illegality,26 other types of managerial decisions
are generally treated as within management’s prerogative.27 Moreover, high
procedural barriers to shareholder claims make them impossible to bring in
all but the most egregious circumstances.28
Federal law, by contrast, has not historically been concerned with the
duties of management vis-à-vis stockholders, or with stockholder governance
rights. It has not regulated managerial behavior or the substantive quality of
a particular investment. Instead, federal law has mostly concerned itself with
disclosure of the details of corporate operations, so that investors—and, more
generally, the market—understand the investment’s character.29
As a result, federal law requires public companies to make copious
amounts of information available on a regular basis. For example, before
issuing new securities, a company must file a registration statement
containing a description of the business, audited financial statements, a
statement of the risks of the investment, the intended uses of the capital
raised, and other similar information.30 Additionally, as long as the securities
remain outstanding, the company must file annual reports with
comprehensive details similar to those required in a registration statement
and shorter quarterly reports containing updated financial information and
management’s explanations for changes in financial results.31 And when
certain critical events occur, the company must issue an immediate update.32
To be sure, the distinctions between federal regulation of disclosure and
state regulation of substance have never been clean. Disclosure itself is a
powerful governance mechanism, if for no other reason than that it deters
fraud and mismanagement.33 Moreover, disclosure requirements force
corporate managers to attend to corporate operations in order to gather
appropriate information, thus imposing a “quasi” duty of care.34 Disclosure
is also critical to giving shareholders a basis for exercising their stateconferred governance rights, such as their right to vote on corporate actions.35
26. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370–71 (Del. 2006).
27. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 130 (Del. Ch.
2009).
28. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining
Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 47–48 (2016);
see also Thompson & Sale, supra note 22, at 865–66.
29. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 pmbl. (“An Act [t]o
provide full and fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof . . . .”).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2016).
31. Id. §§ 249.308a, 249.310.
32. Id. § 249.308.
33. AA Sommer Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. J. 263, 265 (1976) (“Very
simply put, if every instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less
adultery.”).
34. Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal Risk
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L.J. 763, 788 (2016); Thompson & Sale,
supra note 22, at 874, 877–78; see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 588, 614–16 (2003).
35. Park, supra note 22, at 155–56.
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Even when used solely to value a security, disclosure still facilitates the most
important governance right in the shareholders’ arsenal: the right to buy and
sell, i.e., the right of entry and exit.36 By setting market prices, investors send
important signals to managers about the quality of their management, which
in turn acts as a potent disciplinary mechanism.37
Additionally, certain aspects of federal law are specifically directed toward
stockholders’ exercise of the franchise. When the company holds a
shareholder vote,38 federal law requires an extensive description of the
matters to be voted on, including directors’ qualifications, approaches to
corporate governance, and standards for compensating executives.39 Federal
law also contains certain requirements regarding proxy voting, including the
requirement that shareholders be granted access to the corporate proxy for
particular subjects.40
That said, the hallmark of federal regulation has been its emphasis on
disclosure to enable proper valuation, rather than as a tool to impose
governance standards on managers. State law has been left to attend to the
substantive role of stockholders within the corporate structure.41 Even
federal regulation of stockholder voting has been geared toward facilitating
the rights conferred under state law.42 As the SEC once explained, “Although
disclosure requirements may have some indirect effect on corporate conduct,
the Commission may not require disclosure solely for this purpose.”43
B. Private Enforcement Is Oriented Toward
Disclosure for Purposes of Valuation
To enforce its disclosure requirements, federal law relies on the Justice
Department, SEC, and private plaintiffs. These entities are permitted to bring
criminal and civil actions for disclosure violations under a patchwork of
statutes, which require degrees of fault that range from strict liability to

36. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate
Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 516 (2000).
37. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 688–89 (2010). In addition to imposing disclosure
obligations, federal law has directly interfered in corporate governance in other ways. For
example, federal law has long governed proxy voting—a core aspect of governance. See
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26, 26
(2003); Roe, supra note 34, at 598. Federal law has also imposed governance standards via
regulation of listing requirements for stock exchanges. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3, 240.10C1(b)(1).
38. Shareholder votes occur annually to elect directors and additional special votes are
held to decide upon imperative matters. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2009).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
40. Id. § 240.14a-8.
41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012) (recognizing the importance of setting appropriate
prices for securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 pmbl.
42. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879, 894 (1994).
43. Notice of Commission Conclusions and Rulemaking Proposals, Securities Act
Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, 8 SEC Docket 33, 41, 45 (Oct. 29,
1975).
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willful or intentional misconduct.44 Though this ad hoc system of
enforcement has been the frequent target of both scholarly and political ire,45
Congress and the SEC have repeatedly stated that they rely on both public
and private enforcement efforts to compensate investors and ensure
compliance with the law.46 The SEC, for example, has admitted that it does
not have the resources to police the entire securities industry.47 Instead, it
relies on private plaintiffs to provide assistance,48 which may become even
more necessary if—as appears possible—the SEC’s system of administrative
adjudication is found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court.49
Thus, for the past several decades, the securities regulation architecture has

44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k–l, 77q, 78i–j, 78r; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. See generally Samuel
W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511 (2011).
45. See generally James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the
Securities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012) (describing proposals to centralize
enforcement).
46. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“[P]rivate lawsuits
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter wrongdoing and
to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly perform
their jobs.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1, Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (No. 06-484) (“Meritorious private
actions are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement
actions . . . .”).
47. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 1260 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 105th
Cong. 41 (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) (“Private actions are an
especially important supplement to the Commission’s enforcement program today because of
the phenomenal growth of the securities industry during a time when the Commission’s staff
and budget levels have remained relatively constant.”).
48. See id.; Securities Investor Protection Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 1533 Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. of the Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.
15–16 (1992) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC) (“Because the Commission
does not have adequate resources to detect and prosecute all violations of the federal securities
laws, private actions perform a critical role in preserving the integrity of our securities
markets.”); Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, SEC, Outmanned and Outgunned: Fighting on Behalf
of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections, Address at the North American
Securities Administrators Association Annual NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference (Apr. 16,
2013) (“It is unrealistic to expect that state regulators or the SEC will have the resources to
police all securities frauds or go after every fraudster. Investors should have the ability to
protect themselves.”); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as
Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 101 (2008) (“Despite the SEC’s status as a
highly regarded institution, both limited resources and agency capture hinder optimal
enforcement.”); Langevoort, supra note 22, at 476 (“Enforcement personnel are spread thin
not only among investigations and actions involving managerial accountability, but numerous
other matters, such as the conduct of the securities industry and its associated persons. The
numbers are only part of the story. SEC enforcement lawyers are underpaid, leading to high
rates of turnover. This high rate of turnover, in turn, means a loss of experience and expertise,
a large burden given the resources and talent typically on the other side of an important
enforcement matter. The consequence is far fewer investigations and enforcement actions
than optimal, and a pressure to settle rather than take a case through an expensive trial . . . .”).
49. There is currently a dispute about whether the appointment of SEC administrative
judges (and constraints on their removal) violates Article II. See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d
1168, 1183 (10th Cir. 2016). It has been suggested that the Supreme Court may invalidate the
current structure. See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, Gorsuch Could Tip Scales Against SEC’s
Admin Court, LAW360 (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/887745/gorsuchcould-tip-scales-against-sec-s-admin-court [https://perma.cc/28W4-P28G].
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been designed with the expectation that private plaintiffs will prove a
“necessary supplement to Commission action.”50 And, in fact, some have
endorsed the decentralized enforcement model that currently prevails:
entrepreneurial plaintiffs may be more willing to invest in complex cases and
expand the boundaries of the law than their public counterparts.51
The most significant cause of action available to private investors arises
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.52 Section 10(b) broadly prohibits any “manipulative or
deceptive” conduct “in connection with the purchase or sale” of a security53
and, as relevant here, Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits false statements, or misleading
omissions, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”54 The
statute and rule, then, are oriented toward fraud that influences transactions,
namely, buying and selling, and not the quality of corporate governance.
Investors who wish to bring claims under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b)
must prove: (1) the existence of a misstatement (2) that is material to
investors (3) made intentionally or recklessly (4) on which investors relied
(5) that caused economic losses and (6) caused damages.55 In recognition of
the distinct spheres of federal and state corporate regulation, the Supreme
Court held in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green56 that section 10(b) does not
extend to claims based solely on violations of fiduciary duty, such as
negligent, reckless, or disloyal behavior; instead, such matters are regulated
by state law.57 Thus, in keeping with the federal emphasis on disclosure and
valuation, section 10(b) is only available for claims based on deceptive
conduct. By now, it has become something of a cliché for courts to declare
that section 10(b) is unavailable merely to challenge mismanagement.58
That section 10(b) is not in the first instance designed to address
governance deficiencies is hardly a surprise; indeed, one of the earliest
Supreme Court cases on the subject, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,59 limited private section 10(b) claims to plaintiffs who either bought
or sold a security, rather than to plaintiffs who merely held a security.60 Blue
Chip was not intended to thwart governance claims so much as frivolous

50. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (quoting J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
51. See Park, supra note 22, at 127–28, 160; see also Burch, supra note 48, at 75, 81–82.
52. There are a few other significant causes of action available to investors for false
corporate statements, but all are limited in particular ways. For example, Rule 14a-9 is
applicable only to false proxies and has very tight causation requirements for plaintiffs seeking
damages. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. Section 11 only applies when a
corporation issues new securities and is nearly impossible to use for stock issued after the
initial public offering. See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and
12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429, 432 (2000).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
55. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005).
56. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
57. Id. at 474.
58. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 537 (3d Cir. 1999).
59. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
60. Id. at 754–55.
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ones,61 but it orients section 10(b) toward investors in their capacity as
consumers of a corporate product—corporate securities—rather than as
participants in the enterprise.62
The remaining elements of a section 10(b) cause of action continue in this
vein, focusing on the process of price setting. Materiality is defined in terms
of information that “would have . . . significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of
information” for the purpose of investment decisions.63 Damages are usually
defined to mean the difference between the price investors paid for the
security and its true value at the time of purchase.64 All of these elements,
then, treat disclosures as relevant solely for the purpose of allowing investors
to value a security when directly engaged in buying or selling. Even the
reliance element of section 10(b) has largely been transformed into an inquiry
into proper valuation, via courts’ adoption of the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.
Decades ago, courts recognized that section 10(b) claims based on open
market frauds—public statements that influence the price of securities in
organized markets—are uniquely difficult to bring. They are extremely
expensive to litigate relative to the size of most investments, and establishing
reliance on false information in this context presents special challenges.
Most investors rely on a variety of information sources, including statements
issued directly by the corporation as well as recommendations from analysts
and associates (who themselves may have relied on corporate-issued
information), news stories, and other types of data. Indexed investors may
not rely on corporate-specific information at all.65
In response, courts developed the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which
eliminates the need to examine reliance on an investor-by-investor basis.66
The doctrine affords plaintiffs in a section 10(b) action the benefit of two
presumptions:
first, that any material information—including false
information—introduced into an “open and developed market” influences
stock prices,67 and second, that investors who transact in such a market “rely”
on stock prices when they purchase at the market price.68 Together, the two
presumptions become a syllogism: investors who rely on prices that have
been distorted by fraud have, indirectly, relied on the fraud itself.69

61. Id. at 739.
62. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1741–44 (2012).
63. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
64. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 682 n.30 (5th Cir. 2015).
65. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH.
U. L. REV. 895, 916 (2013).
66. See generally Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014);
Basic, 485 U.S. 224.
67. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986)).
68. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2411.
69. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42.
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The doctrine thus kills two birds with one stone. First, it eases the burden
on plaintiffs attempting to prove reliance.70 Second, because reliance is
decided based on market characteristics rather than investor characteristics,
it facilitates the use of the class actions, which mitigates the expenses
associated with individual claims.71 Today, most section 10(b) claims
involving open-market fraud are brought using the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.72 Thus, the element of reliance is no longer an inquiry into the
actual preferences of defrauded investors but is instead an inquiry into the
market-wide impact of corporate statements on the pricing of securities.
The existence of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine represents a trade-off
between the goals of compensation and deterrence. The two are somewhat
at odds: deterrence is best achieved via the high damages available through
collective action, but the risks and coordination problems inherent in such
actions encourage settlements that result in little investor compensation.73 To
achieve truly compensatory damages, then, shareholders must file individual
lawsuits that have little deterrent effect; meanwhile, the complexity and
expenses of such actions make them difficult to pursue in the first place. In
light of these trade-offs, our legal system has largely favored deterrence with
almost all actions proceeding on a class basis.74 As a result, questions
regarding the proper interpretation of section 10(b) similarly tend to arise in
the class action context.
In recent years, however, the purposes of federal mandatory disclosure
have changed. These changes have placed increasing pressures on an
enforcement regime that was designed for a different era.

70. Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2408 (noting that under the fraud-on-the-market theory,
investors are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance and are not required to show
direct reliance on an individual basis).
71. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA
L. REV. 811, 818 (2009).
72. Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1303 (2008).
73. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 28, at 65.
74. State law might, in some situations, provide a remedy for deceived investors as well.
However, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 would bar investors from
bringing claims collectively, or even coordinating individual claims with a pending class
action, which may be necessary for investors to litigate effectively. See Benjamin P. Edwards,
Disaggregated Classes, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 305, 327–30 (2015). Additionally, it is not clear
that all states would provide a remedy for open market frauds where the investors are not in
privity with the defendants and did not receive direct communications from them. Cf. In re
Bear Stearns Cos. Secs., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., 995 F. Supp. 2d 291, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (noting that under New York common law, liability of an auditor is limited to “‘the
persons or class of persons’ to whom the auditor intends to communicate its representations”
(quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 446–47 (N.Y. 1931))). Finally, states
tend to take their cues from federal law when crafting their own investor protections.
Delaware, for example, has imported the federal definition of materiality into its own law. See
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985). State common law may borrow
loss causation standards from federal law as well. See, e.g., Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v.
Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2015); King County v. IKB Deutsche
Industriebank AG, 708 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Basis Pac-Rim
Opportunity Fund (Master) v. TCW Asset Mgmt. Co., 48 N.Y.S.3d 654, 656 (App. Div. 2017).
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II. DISCLOSURE’S EVOLUTION:
FROM VALUATION TO GOVERNANCE
Despite shareholders’ limited powers under state law, federal law has
gradually increased shareholders’ ability to influence corporate behavior and
encouraged shareholders to flex their newly invigorated muscles.
Federal disclosure standards have long been geared toward informing
investors of the character of the security—which in more modern terms refers
to facilitating price accuracy—with the additional goal of detecting and
preventing fraud and embezzlement.75 For many years, critics of the dual
regime for regulating corporations insisted that managers have too much
power vis-à-vis shareholders and use this power to extract economic rents to
the shareholders’ detriment.76 Some argued that increasing shareholder
power will cause management to be more responsive to shareholder desires,
which ultimately will result in more loyal managers and better-run, more
profitable companies.77 Federal law has responded to this criticism by
developing new rules aimed at enhancing shareholder power within the
corporate structure.
These initiatives take a two-pronged approach. First, federal law has
directly expanded shareholder governance powers in publicly traded
companies. Though buying and selling necessarily remains one of the most
powerful weapons in the shareholder arsenal, the SEC has also taken steps to
increase shareholder power by deregulating communications among
shareholders regarding proxy voting,78 imposing limitations on the authority
of brokers to vote stock in the absence of shareholder instructions,79 requiring
that corporations “unbundle” proposals to allow for separate shareholder
votes,80 and loosening restrictions on shareholders’ ability to use corporate
proxies to affect director elections.81 Federal law has also required
nonbinding “say on pay” votes requiring shareholder approval of executive
pay packages.82 These measures have greatly enhanced shareholders’ ability
to influence corporate behavior.

75. See supra Part I.B; see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities
Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 773 (1995); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as
a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1995).
76. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61 (2004); Bebchuk, supra note 3, at
898; Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1907, 1911 (2013).
77. See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 855–56.
78. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016); James D. Cox
& Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and
Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class
Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005).
79. N.Y.S.E. RULES r. 452.
80. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(a)(3), (b)(1) (2016).
81. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,707 (Sept. 16,
2010).
82. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010).
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Second, shareholders’ new governance powers are complemented by
expanded federal disclosure requirements. These disclosures are intended
less to assist with the proper valuation of securities than to encourage
investors to police the quality of corporate decision-making.83 For example,
one of the most controversial aspects of corporate governance concerns
executive compensation, and volumes have been written weighing in on
optimal compensation designs.84 Though the responsibility for designing
pay packages rests with corporate directors, the SEC has gradually expanded
disclosure requirements pertaining to executive compensation, with pages of
instruction dedicated to “providing specific categories of compensation and
exact formulations for the charts in which management must present the
information.”85 The SEC thus openly encourages investors to evaluate
directors’ decision-making processes and, if necessary, apply pressure to
alter them.
The global financial crisis heightened concerns that corporate
compensation was poorly calibrated to align managerial incentives with
shareholder desires. Commentators argued that compensation structures
were designed to reward short-term risk-taking at the expense of the longterm health of the enterprise.86 In response, federal statutes and regulations
imposed new requirements that companies disclose the relationship between
compensation policies and corporate risk-taking87 and the relationship
between compensation and corporate performance,88 and identify the ratio
between the compensation of the CEO and the compensation of the median
employee.89 Once again, these disclosures are facially not intended to assist
with valuation, but rather aim to provide specific information that
shareholders can use as a lever to influence corporate behavior.90 As Hillary
Sale describes it, “The regulations have been growing steadily and are not
solely about disclosure. Instead, the regulations are about the power of
disclosure to force substance.”91
83. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Corporate Governance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Limits of Disclosure, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 65 (2007); Mariana
Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359, 389 (2016); Park,
supra note 22, at 136 (“[D]isclosure is increasingly used as a method for influencing corporate
affairs.”).
84. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 76; David Walker, The Law and
Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW 232 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012);
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103
MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021 (1999).
85. Thompson & Sale, supra note 22, at 875 (footnote omitted).
86. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO.
L.J. 247, 249 (2010); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why
Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV.
1019, 1047 (2012).
87. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,335 (Dec. 23, 2009).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(1) (2012).
89. Id. § 78l.
90. See Hillary A. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137,
143–44 (2011).
91. Id. at 144.
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Federal law also contains a host of other disclosure requirements that give
shareholders insight into the processes by which decisions are made, and thus
a foothold into influencing those processes. For example, public corporations
must disclose costs associated with environmental compliance,92 board
diversity and independence,93 managerial oversight of internal information
flow,94 their reasons for not separating the chairperson and CEO roles,95 and
any codes of ethics governing corporate managers, including waivers of those
codes.96 The SEC also requires companies to disclose how often the board
of directors meets and identify any directors who attend fewer than 75 percent
of those meetings.97 By requiring that this information be disclosed, federal
law not only gives investors a window into corporate operations, which they
may use when they exercise their governance powers, but also makes
particular issues more salient, thus encouraging greater shareholder attention.
When combined with the long-standing requirements that corporations
disclose any known trends that could impact operations98 and the risks
associated with their securities (including legal risks),99 the collective weight
of required federal disclosures becomes a significant starting point for
shareholder engagement.
To be sure, there have been signals that the current Congress may rollback
some of the recent changes to the federal scheme.100 As of this writing,
however, the regulatory framework remains intact, and therefore represents
the current direction of federal policy.
Moreover, this new regime has not ended with federally imposed
disclosure requirements. The more power shareholders gain, the more
information they themselves demand from their companies, further
enhancing their ability to participate in governance. Thus, shareholders have
forced corporations to disclose more information about political spending,101
Investors have particularly
sustainability,102 and similar issues.103
92. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(h)(4)(x1) (2016).
93. Id. § 229.407(b)(3)(vi); see also Andrea Vittorio, Board Diversity Advocates Aren’t
Giving up on Disclosures, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bna.com/boarddiversity-advocates-n57982084793/ [https://perma.cc/TS48-YFFA] (describing efforts to
increase diversity disclosures).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14.
95. Id. § 229.407.
96. Id. § 229.406.
97. Id. § 229.407(2)(d).
98. Id. § 229.303.
99. Id. § 229.503.
100. See Gretchen Morgenson, Meet the Legislation Designed to Stifle Shareholders, N.Y.
TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/business/wells-fargo-clawbackfair-choice-act-shareholders.html [https://perma.cc/MCC4-HWMS].
101. See generally Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private
Ordering of Public Elections, 126 YALE L.J. 262 (2016).
102. Justin Morton, Investors Seek More Measures of Chemicals and Pesticide Use,
BLOOMBERG BNA: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Nov. 17, 2016, at 1; PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Investors, Corporates, and ESG: Bridging the Gap, GOVERNANCE INSIGHTS, Oct. 2016, at 3.
103. See, e.g., SPENCERSTUART, SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX: A PERSPECTIVE ON U.S.
BOARDS 3 (2016) (describing how boards are disclosing more about governance in response
to investor demand); Laura Colby, Goldman, BNY Mellon Bow to Investor Pressure on Gender
Pay, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
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encouraged corporations to make greater disclosures about—and devote
greater attention to—risks associated with climate change.104 Collectively,
these types of disclosures are known as “Environmental, Social,
Governance” (ESG) disclosures.
Evidence suggests that investors
increasingly seek out investment opportunities based on companies’ ESG
disclosures,105 and companies in turn encourage investors to evaluate their
performance along these dimensions.106
In sum, federal law has undergone a significant shift. Even as newer
regulations take the form of disclosure requirements, they are transparently
designed to grant shareholders a greater voice in the conduct of corporate
operations. That power has snowballed, allowing shareholders to claim even
more voice via disclosure.
Critical to these efforts has been the rise of the institutional shareholder.107
It has long been recognized that dispersed, rationally passive retail
stockholders cannot be expected to exert serious pressure on management.
These shareholders suffer from difficult collective action problems and lack
both the expertise and the incentives to educate themselves on corporate
governance issues.108 In recent decades, however, stock ownership has
become concentrated among a relatively small group of large institutional
investors.109 For these investors, merely selling their stock to express
23/goldman-bny-mellon-bow-to-investor-pressure-on-gender-pay-gap
[https://perma.cc/ZZD5-59X9]; Ross Kerber, Exclusive: BlackRock Vows New Pressure on
Climate, Board Diversity, REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/usblackrock-climate-exclusive-idUSKBN16K0CR [https://perma.cc/VS96-4Z6C] (“BlackRock
Inc, which wields outsized clout as the world’s largest asset manager, planned on Monday to
put new pressure on companies to explain themselves on issues including how climate change
could affect their business as well as boardroom diversity.”); Jena McGregor, A Surprising
Number of Investors Voted for a Gender Pay Gap Measure at eBay, WASH. POST (Apr. 28,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/04/28/a-surprisingnumber-of-investors-voted-for-a-gender-pay-gap-measure-at-ebay/?utm_term=
.c1816805f2aa [https://perma.cc/H8FP-4NDD].
104. See generally Kerber, supra note 103; Vittorio, supra note 20; Giovanna Michelon et
al., No Pressure, No Diamonds: The Role of Shareholder Activism on CSR Transparency
(May 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2817276 [https://perma.cc/3EMP-798B].
105. CFA INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE (ESG) SURVEY 5 (2015);
Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 185; PricewaterhouseCoopers, supra note 102, at 2; Justin
Baer, State Street Offers New Tool to Gauge Environmental, Other Social Risks, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-street-offers-new-tool-to-gaugeenvironmental-other-social-risks-1490532564 [https://perma.cc/DC7Z-3TBZ]; Randall
Smith, Investors Sharpen Focus on Social and Environmental Risks to Stocks, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/business/dealbook/investors-socialenvironmental-corporate-governance.html [https://perma.cc/3EUM-RWQB].
106. See Steve Burkholder, ‘Integrated Reporting’ Attracts More Companies World-Wide,
BLOOMBERG BNA, Mar. 14, 2017, at 1.
107. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
108. See generally id.
109. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 573 (2006); Vipal Monga & David Benoit, Companies Forgot About Mom-andPop Investors . . . Until Now, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/companies-forgot-about-mom-and-pop-investors-until-now-1468920601
[https://perma.cc/QR7W-2ZN6]; see also Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three?:
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disapproval of management is not always an option.110 Holdings may be so
large that divestment would drive prices down, causing the shareholder to
incur substantial losses.111 Indexed investors cannot sell at all in response to
bad management.112 Thus, in many instances, direct policing of corporate
management has become a preferable alternative, or at least a supplement, to
the Wall Street Walk. The large stakes held or controlled by these institutions
strengthen both their incentives to monitor corporate management and their
leverage when doing so.113 Monitoring costs have also been reduced by
proxy advisory services, like Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass
Lewis, which provide recommendations to institutions as to how to vote their
shares.114
The new federal initiatives take advantage of these developments, and the
expanded disclosures and governance powers granted to shareholders assume
an audience of investors capable of assimilating and making use of the new
information. Federal law has even encouraged greater institutional
participation in governance by articulating fiduciary duties of institutional
investors to vote their shares and requiring disclosure of mutual fund
votes.115
The experiment has panned out: institutional shareholders have become
much more likely to engage directly with management and advocate for
changes in governance.116 They may sponsor shareholder proposals
Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership and New Financial Risk, 19
BUS. & POL. 298, 299–300 (2017).
110. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Shareholder Access to the
Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1355.
111. Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual Fund
Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914, 916 (2011).
112. See David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class
Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157, 160 (2012).
113. See, e.g., John Authers, Passive Investors Are Good Corporate Stewards, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/c4e7a4f6-be8a-11e5-846f-79b0e3d20eaf
[https://perma.cc/QJG5-2D3H].
114. Notably, these advisory services are the intellectual descendants of shareholder
advisory services that were proposed in the 1930s, specifically with a view toward advancing
the general public interest. See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours
of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503, 1531, 1544 (2006).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–(6) (2016); Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and
Corporate Governance: What Is the “Progressive” Agenda? 25 (Wash. & Lee Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 2017-4, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2917253 [https://perma.cc/WX5F-SU9H] (describing federal regulations that require
pension plans to “engage in strong-form activism”). Federal regulators have also made clear
that pension funds may take the ESG factors into account without violating their fiduciary
duties. Interpretative Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Duty Standard Under ERISA in
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,135, 65,135–36 (Oct. 26,
2015).
116. See, e.g., Reena Aggarwal et al., The Role of Institutional Investors in Voting:
Evidence from the Securities Lending Market, 52 J. FIN. 2309, 2311 (2015); Ian Appel et al.,
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 114 (2016); Ying Duan &
Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual
Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 489, 491–
92 (2016); Morgan et al., supra note 111, at 927; Jeff Green & Emily Chasan, Investors Push
Corporate Boards to Add Women, People of Color, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-02/shareholders-target-pale-male-and-
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designed to prompt management to adopt various reforms or support
dissident candidates for director slots. On a more basic level, though,
institutions have begun addressing management through “soft” forms of
engagement—discussions, counseling sessions, and negotiation—none of
which necessarily ends in divestiture or a proxy contest.117 When matters are
addressed through shareholder votes, the proposals are typically precatory;
they operate as suggestions to management, rather than commands. Even
when they fail, significant minority support can prompt management to adopt
voluntary reform.118 Under pressure from shareholders, many companies
have adopted new standards that directors be elected with a majority—rather
than the traditional plurality—of shareholder votes, but these standards are
likewise often nonbinding; they represent a form of communication rather
than direct control.119 The SEC has strongly encouraged these types of
dialogues between institutional investors and corporate boards.120
The difficulty with disclosure as a governance mechanism, however, is that
the federal enforcement apparatus continues to view the matter solely through
the lens of valuation. As the substance-disclosure line is eroded and the role
stale-corporate-boards [https://perma.cc/A7XA-RDSZ]; Kerber, supra note 103; Joann S.
Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against Companies That Don’t Have
Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-street-saysit-will-start-voting-against-companies-that-dont-have-women-directors-1488862863
[https://perma.cc/WS2Y-RGZK]; Alexandra Stevenson & Leslie Picker, A Rare Corner of
Finance
Where
Women
Dominate,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
16,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/16/business/dealbook/women-corporate-governanceshareholders.html [https://perma.cc/7DGU-49MK]; Ian Appel et al., Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of Passive Investors on Activism 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22707, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22707.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6B9A-588F].
117. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder Engagement?, 2013 U.
ILL. L. REV. 821; Fichtner et al., supra note 109; Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi,
Engagement: The Missing Middle in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385
(2016); Steven Davidoff Solomon, A New Strategy for Shareholder Activism: Engagement,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/business/dealbook/a-newstrategy-for-shareholder-activism-engagement.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9QNC-ZHF5].
118. Palmiter, supra note 42, at 917.
119. Julian Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 909–
10.
120. See George S. Georgiev, Shareholder vs. Investor Primacy in Federal Corporate
Governance, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 71, 75 (2014), http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/
discourse/62-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/T95Q-SR92]. Tellingly, the shift in investor composition
has not gone unnoticed at the state level where direct regulation of management conduct
typically occurs. Delaware (which takes the lead in the formation of corporate law) has
concluded that otherwise negligent or disloyal managerial action can be cleansed by a
shareholder vote upon disclosure of all material facts, making disclosure—rather than
substantive evaluation of managerial behavior—the fulcrum on which fiduciary duties turn.
Thus, like federal law, states increasingly expect investors, enabled by management
disclosures, to take an active role in protecting their own interests. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR
Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 308 (Del. 2015); In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808
A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) (recognizing the “increased activism of institutional investors
and the greater information flows available to them”); J. Travis Laster, Changing Attitudes:
The Stark Results of Thirty Years of Evolution in Delaware M&A Litigation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982603
[https://perma.cc/M8JQN66M].
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of the shareholder is placed in flux, section 10(b) doctrine has become
increasingly out of step with federal policy and, worse, actively undermines
it by denying shareholders the role in the corporate governance structure that
federal law is attempting to encourage. The danger is particularly acute due
to the federal system’s reliance on private enforcement as a mechanism for
enforcement and deterrence.121
III. JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ENFORCEMENT OF THE
NEW DISCLOSURE REGIME
The shift in the purposes of federal disclosure presents new challenges to
enforcement. Section 10(b), with its emphasis on disclosure for purposes of
valuation, is not crafted to address disclosure violations whose most
immediate effect is to diminish shareholders’ ability to discipline corporate
managers. It still could play that role, however, if not for overly cramped
judicial interpretations of the statute that were designed for an earlier era.
A. Federal Law Contains No Cause of Action
Designed to Enforce
Governance-Related Disclosures
The federal trend toward requiring companies to open their governance
processes to shareholder participation is relatively new; as a result, there
exists no private cause of action specifically designed to allow shareholders
to enforce their rights. The closest thing to a “governance” claim under
federal law arises under Rule 14a-9, promulgated under section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act.122 That rule prohibits false statements in corporate proxy
materials and thus explicitly recognizes deception in a manner that injures
shareholders’ governance rights as an actionable harm.123 However, Rule
14a-9 does not address corporate statements made outside the proxy context
that may influence voting decisions, nor does it acknowledge or protect any
of the other forms of shareholder engagement, beyond simply casting a vote,
that have come to dominate the landscape.
Additionally, at least when it comes to damages claims, Rule 14a-9 has
been interpreted to require very tight causation requirements between the
vote and the injury alleged by stockholders. Under these standards, plaintiffs
must show that a shareholder vote was necessary to complete the particular
challenged transaction.124 It is not sufficient, for example, to show that
shareholders were misled into supporting a director who then made poor
governance choices.125 As a result, Rule 14a-9 may not permit claims
associated with precatory votes, or votes that—while failing to win a
majority—still gain the support of an influential minority, both of which are

121. See supra Part I.B.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2016).
123. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 377 (1970).
124. Plaintiffs must show that a shareholder vote was necessary to complete the particular
challenged transaction. See Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1105–08 (1991).
125. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cathcart, 980 F.2d 927, 933 (3d Cir. 1992).
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key mechanisms for shareholder participation today. Thus, Rule 14a-9 has
limited utility for protecting shareholders’ ability to participate in corporate
decision-making, leaving section 10(b) to fill the vacuum.
B. Section 10(b) as an Alternative Option
Though not structured with this aim in mind, section 10(b) can be used to
enhance shareholder participation rights by punishing false or misleading
statements relating to corporate governance mechanisms.
When a
corporation misleads investors on a subject regarding its internal processes—
for example, by falsely claiming to have adopted compliance policies or risk
mitigation strategies—that statement is actionable under section 10(b). As
one court put it, “[T]he mere fact that the conduct in question arguably
constitutes mismanagement will not preclude a claim under the federal
securities laws if the defendant made a statement of material fact wholly
inconsistent with known existing mismanagement.”126 The threat of
damages for such statements can deter corporations from issuing false
statements in the first place. Once full disclosure has been made—for
example, the admission of flawed risk management—shareholders are now
in a position to pressure the company to correct its policies. Indeed, many
scholars have championed section 10(b) as a deterrent mechanism to ensure
the quality of corporate governance.127
The chief obstacle to utilizing section 10(b) in this manner, however, is
judicial resistance. As described above, section 10(b) claims must be rooted
in deceptive conduct—a mere failure to govern properly is not sufficient.128
However, the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which functionally eliminates
the element of reliance, threatens to make any kind of undisclosed problem
actionable under section 10(b). This leaves courts unable to distinguish cases
involving true deception of investors from attacks on the quality of
governance itself.
Typically, a fraud-on-the-market claim begins when bad news is released
about a public company. The news might explicitly admit that prior
statements were false—such as a restatement of previously released financial
results—but more commonly, it represents a negative legal or business
development, such as a drop in sales, a product defect, or a regulatory
investigation. The job of the plaintiffs’ attorney is then to identify statements
upon which investors may plausibly have relied and that are arguably
rendered false by the newly disclosed problems. The plaintiff-investor does
not even need to have relied on particular statements, as would be required
for an ordinary fraud claim, because whether one investor did or did not
personally rely on a statement is not the issue. The issue is whether the
market as a whole was fooled. Indeed, no single investor is, or should be,
126. Portannese v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., No. 97-CV-2011 CBA, 1998 WL 637547, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1998).
127. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 28; Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for
Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297, 325–30;
Thompson & Sale, supra note 22.
128. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
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capable of identifying all of the statements that may have influenced the
market.129 Courts entertaining fraud-on-the-market claims have gone so far
as to exclude evidence as to whether particular investors relied on particular
statements, recognizing that any single investor’s experience is beside the
point.130
Given the extensive disclosure requirements imposed on public
corporations, many of which directly concern the quality of governance, risk
management systems, and business trends, it is likely that if there was an
undisclosed problem known to the company at the time (as required by
section 10(b)’s scienter element),131 plaintiffs’ attorneys would be able to
identify some public statement that was arguably false at the time it was
issued.132 And because fraud-on-the-market does not require investors to
prove that they relied on the statement, there is a chance that there will always
be a potential section 10(b) claim based on any unfavorable information that
was known to management and kept secret for any length of time. As a result,
it is the substantive conduct, rather than the ostensibly false statement, that
becomes the center of gravity for many section 10(b) claims.133
To be sure, from a normative perspective, this is not necessarily a bad
thing. The federal securities laws contain extensive disclosure requirements
precisely to prevent companies from concealing problems from the market
for prolonged periods. One might reasonably argue, then, that such
concealment should be actionable. To do so, however, is to elide the
distinction between governance and disclosure that has historically
characterized the separate spheres of federal and state law.134
Courts addressing section 10(b) claims are thus tasked with discriminating
between disclosure claims and governance claims without reference to the
most obvious distinguishing factor: the presence of a deceived investor.
Instead, they have crafted a series of alternative inquiries that cabin section

129. Ann M. Lipton, Slouching Towards Monell: The Disappearance of Vicarious
Liability Under Section 10(b), 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1261, 1263 (2015).
130. See In re ICN/Viratek Sec. Litig., No. 87 Civ. 4296, 1996 WL 34448146, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1996) (“The defendants would like to subpoena six members of a class the
members of which number in the thousands. If I were to allow them to do so, and if the class
representatives testified that they did not find defendants’ allegedly fraudulent statements
material, then it would be reasonable for the Class to request that I allow it to subpoena six
class representatives of its own by way of rebuttal, who would likely testify that they did find
the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent statements material. The larger the number of actual
investors to testify at trial and the lengthier the ‘mini-trial’ on actual investors’ reliance, the
more the jury would understandably be distracted from the ‘reasonable investor’ standard of
materiality.”).
131. See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
132. Langevoort, supra note 22, at 451, 460; Lipton, supra note 129, at 1293–94.
Theoretically, concepts of loss causation and damages might serve as another gating item: if
the misstatements themselves did not impact the price of the security, there would not be any
losses or damages associated with them. That inquiry, however, is far more complex than it
seems.
133. Lipton, supra note 129, at 1293–94.
134. See supra Part I.
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10(b)’s scope.135 But these inquiries undermine efforts to use disclosure to
empower shareholders as corporate constituents.136
1. Puffery
Puffery is a concept that exists in multiple areas of law and creates a legal
immunity for vague, overly optimistic, or hyperbolic statements.137 The
intuition behind the doctrine is that salespersons can be expected to hype their
wares with overclaims—“world’s best coffee!”—and it would be
unreasonable for purchasers to rely on such statements when transacting.
Puffery is vigorously employed by courts to dismiss claims under section
10(b).138 It is typically defined as a species of immaterial statement that is
so vague, optimistic, self-congratulatory, or boilerplate that investors are
presumed to simply disregard it.139 The puffery doctrine is a mechanism that
courts can use to screen out claims that are, or appear to be, rooted in
objections to management’s conduct, rather than based on deceptive
behavior. Per Santa Fe, absent a false statement, there has been no fraud,
and thus no claim under section 10(b).140 Puffing statements are not
“statements” for section 10(b) purposes141; take them away, and all that’s left
is a complaint about management’s substantive governance choices.
Thus, it is unsurprising that courts frequently dismiss on puffery grounds
claims that facially appear to be failed products of the litigation process
described above: namely, bad news was announced, attorneys searched for
false statements, and, frequently in the absence of anything more concrete,
seized upon banal, vaguely optimistic representations. For example, in
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp.,142 after a company experienced business
failures, the plaintiffs filed a section 10(b) action attacking such statements
as “the second quarter was a period of significant accomplishment . . . [o]ur
fundamentals are strong,” and that the company had “growth opportunities”
due to funding raised in its IPO.143 In IBEW Local Union No. 58 Pension
Trust Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC,144 a
section 10(b) lawsuit was filed when an ultimately unsuccessful merger was
135. See infra Part III.A–B.
136. See infra Part III.A–B.
137. See David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1400–
14 (2006); Jennifer O’Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-Emergence
of the Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1701–15
(1998).
138. David A. Hoffman, The “Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537,
575 (2006); Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them,
10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 354 (2008).
139. See Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004);
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way
Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY
L.J. 83, 119 (2002).
140. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977).
141. Id. at 477–79.
142. 332 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2003).
143. Id. at 860 (first alteration in original).
144. 783 F.3d 383 (2d Cir. 2015).
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described as “off to a promising start.”145 When a cruise company revealed
sagging bookings, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that earlier representations
of “encouraging” prospects were fraudulent.146 In one case, the plaintiffs
openly alleged that the company failed to disclose a “change in business
philosophy” that threatened its financial results, resulting in a dismissal on
the ground that the prior business philosophy had been disclosed only in
puffing terms.147 Similar examples abound.148 For these cases in particular,
the plaintiffs’ chief complaint appears to be fundamentally rooted in
objections to management performance with deception tacked on as a legal
hook to shoehorn the claim into section 10(b).
The puffery doctrine has been heavily criticized by commentators, partly
for the notorious inconsistency with which it is applied,149 and partly for
representing a kind of armchair market psychology. Courts purport to
identify what information investors “truly” value, but there is extensive
evidence that these assumptions are not correct.150 Without disputing the
validity of these criticisms, it is better to recognize that the doctrine is
frequently not used as a mechanism for identifying statements that investors
do, or do not, “actually” rely upon. Indeed, faced with evidence of actual
reliance, courts have still rejected some claims on puffery grounds.151
Instead, the doctrine represents a rejection of at least some attempts to use
section 10(b) to police the quality of management. As one court put it,
“[i]nvestment gains and losses are risks inherent in a capitalist system, and
these risks are tacitly accepted when any group or individual chooses to
invest,”152 and therefore puffing statements do not “necessitate disclosure of
every event that occurred in the course of [a corporation’s] daily
145. Id. at 388.
146. In re Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 1:11-22853-CIV., 2013 WL 3295951, at *3
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 2013).
147. In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Sec. Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 165, 169 (D.D.C.
2007).
148. See, e.g., In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (following
announcement of layoffs, “we believe our employee relations are good”); Grossman v. Novell,
Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir. 1997) (merger was moving “faster than we thought” and
presented a “compelling set of opportunities”); Local 210 Unity Pension & Welfare Funds v.
McDermott Int’l Inc., No. 13-cv-02393, 2015 WL 10859309 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2015)
(company would “implement[] a comprehensive project execution operating model that
emphasizes our key project management disciplines”); Zerger v. Midway Games, Inc., No.
07C3739, 2009 WL 3380653, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2009) (merger “is consistent with our
strategy of adding depth to our internal product development organization and strengthening
our ability to deliver high quality, compelling and commercially successful content for current
and future systems”); In re Wet Seal, Inc. Sec. Litig., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1167 (C.D. Cal.
2007) (“I am personally very excited about the fashion [Alfaro] has developed . . . and am
looking forward to showing you the new assortment in the stores next year”).
149. See Hoffman, supra note 137, at 1403–04; Stefan J. Padfield, Immaterial Lies:
Condoning Deceit in the Name of Securities Regulation, 61 CASE W. RES. 143, 165 (2010).
150. See Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 139, at 120–21; Hoffman, supra note 138, at 557;
Padfield, supra note 138, at 340–41, 372.
151. See, e.g., Police Ret. Sys. v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051, 1060–61, 1064
(9th Cir. 2014).
152. Plumbers Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Ambassador’s Grp., 717 F. Supp. 2d
1170, 1178 (E.D. Wash. 2010).
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operations.”153 For this reason, it is hardly surprising that puffery, once
declared to have “all but gone the way of the dodo,” enjoyed a reemergence
just a few years after the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud-on-the-market
doctrine.154
The trouble with courts’ ad hoc judgment regarding what “counts” as a
governance claim relative to a disclosure claim is that claims based on ESG
statements, such as ethics codes and risk mitigation strategies, are particularly
attractive targets for dismissal on puffery grounds.155 In fact, it is common
for plaintiffs to bring section 10(b) claims based on undisclosed regulatory
violations or other morally questionable behavior, pinned to such allegedly
false statements as “[the company] set the standard for best practices in risk
management techniques”156 or maintained a “culture of high ethical
standards.”157 At the same time, courts adhere to the principle that “general
statements about reputation, integrity, and compliance with ethical norms are
inactionable ‘puffery,’ meaning that they are ‘too general to cause a
reasonable investor to rely upon them.’”158 Courts’ rejections of these
claims—to the point of holding that even federally required disclosures are
“puffery”159—represent a rejection of federal attempts to enlist shareholders
in the governance project.
One of the more overt holdings on the subject came from the Southern
District of New York in a case against Barclays. The court noted:
Plaintiffs . . . argu[e], with respect to statements about legal compliance,
that “when Barclays was telling the public that its ‘business may not be
conducted in accordance with applicable laws around the world’ Barclays
was, at that time, actively violating laws around the world by manipulating
LIBOR.” If this were sufficient, then every individual who purchased the
stock of a company that was later discovered to have broken any law could

153. Id.
154. O’Hare, supra note 137, at 1697.
155. See, e.g., Bondali v. Yum! Brands, Inc., 620 F. App’x 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2015); In re
Sanofi Sec. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re Anadarko Petroleum
Corp. Class Action Litig., 957 F. Supp. 2d 806, 823–25 (S.D. Tex. 2013); In re UBS AG Sec.
Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL 4471265, at *35–36 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012);
Karam v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. CV 10-6523-GHK(PJWx), 2012 WL 8499135, at *10
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012); Waterford Twp. Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. BankUnited Fin. Corp.,
No. 08-CIV-22572, 2010 WL 1332574, at *9–10 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2010).
156. ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553 F.3d 187,
206 (2d Cir. 2009).
157. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir. 2016).
158. Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir.
2014) (quoting ECA, 553 F.3d at 206).
159. Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC promulgated regulations that require
public companies either to disclose their ethics codes or to explain why they do not have them.
See 17 C.F.R. § 229.406 (2016). Nonetheless, courts frequently find that such codes are
puffery. See, e.g., Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. HewlettPackard Co., 845 F.3d 1268, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 2017); In re Key Energy Servs. Sec. Litig.,
166 F. Supp. 3d 822, 860–61 (S.D. Tex. 2016); Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Avon Prods., No. 11
Civ. 4665(PGG), 2014 WL 4832321, at *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2014).
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theoretically sue for fraud. This is precisely what the Second Circuit sought
to avoid [in its puffery rulings].160

In other words, it is puffery to proclaim compliance with the law precisely
because any other holding would force the company to remain true to that
representation.161
In Andropolis v. Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Inc.,162 another court
explicitly wielded the puffery doctrine to prevent disclosure regulations from
influencing substance. There, the court held that ethical codes are puffery
because federal law requires that they be disclosed.163 As the court put it,
“[a] company’s essentially mandatory adoption of a code of ethics simply
does not imply that all of its directors and officers are following that code of
ethics.”164 In fact, “the mandatory nature of the adoption of such a code
makes clear that all public companies—whether run by crooks or angels—
will adopt just such a code.”165
The articulated rationale for many puffery holdings—that the statements
are too similar to those offered by other companies to carry much weight in
the minds of investors166—is not only unpersuasive, but is something of a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Corporations frequently make disclosures similar to
those of other companies, from representations that their financial statements
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles167 to declarations
that a merger price is “fair” to shareholders,168 and yet none of these
statements are declared to be puffery on grounds of ubiquity. Moreover, in
a world where computer programs analyze corporate SEC filings so as to
instantly trade on even minute data changes,169 if a corporation did not, for
example, proclaim itself to exhibit “financial discipline” when all of its

160. Gusinsky v. Barclays PLC, 944 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289–90 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citations
omitted), vacated in part sub nom. Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund of St. Louis v. Barclays PLC,
750 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2014).
161. Notably, any section 10(b) claim would require plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
misstatement or omission was intentionally or recklessly made. Nonetheless, the court feared
that holding the company to its representations—even in the face of knowing or reckless
violations of them—would impose too great a substantive burden.
162. 505 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D. Colo. 2007).
163. It should be noted that SEC regulations do not require adoption of an ethical code;
they require only that companies disclose any code that exists or explain why none has been
adopted. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406. However, both NYSE and NASDAQ require that listed
companies adopt ethical codes. N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.10; NASDAQ
EQUITY RULES § 5610.
164. Andropolis, 505 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86.
165. Id. The court went on to recommend that the plaintiffs pursue state law governance
claims instead of federal disclosure claims. Id. at 686; see also Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store
Union Local 338 Ret. Fund v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 845 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the principles of Santa Fe require that codes of conduct be treated as puffery).
166. See, e.g., ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Tr. v. JP Morgan Chase Co., 553
F.3d 187, 205 (2d Cir. 2009).
167. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.308, 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15.
168. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1562 (2006).
169. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 689 (2013).
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competitors did,170 investors would likely take the absence seriously.171 As
a result, when courts treat all such statements as equally meaningless, they
provide no incentive for corporations to refrain from making them when they
are no longer truthful.172 The further effect is to raise costs for corporations
desiring to single themselves out to shareholders by attesting to their
discipline.173 In other words, courts undermine the use of disclosure as a
mechanism to invite shareholders to participate in the governance project.
2. Loss Causation and Damages
Under section 10(b), a plaintiff must prove the element of “loss causation,”
namely, that the plaintiff experienced an economic loss due to the fraud. The
precise amount of the loss—the plaintiff’s damages—must be established as
well.174 For both measures, courts assume that securities have a “true value”
that represents the price at which they would have traded if investors were
aware of all relevant facts. This “true value” is distinguished from securities’
“inflated value,” meaning the price at which the securities traded as a result
of the lie. Cognizable losses and damages under section 10(b) are generally
defined as the difference between the two.175
These definitions are predicated on a conception of securities as static
objects, worth a certain amount that is or is not distorted by a particular
falsehood. But securities are not static. If someone represents that a glass
ring is a diamond, the amount of the damage caused is readily ascertainable
because the quality of the object remains the same.176 By contrast, if
shareholders are granted a real role in governance, disclosure changes the
quality of the security. Admissions that internal controls are poor, for
example, almost certainly ensure that management will invest in corrective
measures, and confessions that a business initiative has a low probability of
success are likely to cause investors to use all of the tools at their disposal—
selling, voting, and engagement—to insist that the initiative be suspended.
And if a company fails to attest that it has quality controls or risk management

170. Wachovia Equity Sec. Litig. v. Wachovia Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 326, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (holding statements concerning conservative underwriting, integrity, and financial
discipline to be puffery).
171. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit obliquely recognized this point, proclaiming in Eisenstadt
v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997), that “[w]here puffing is the order of the
day, literal truth can be profoundly misleading,” thus conceding that whatever the standard
representation may be, a deviation from that standard communicates information to investors.
Cf. Ann M. Lipton, Searching for Market Efficiency, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 75 (2015).
172. Cf. Robert Gutsche et al., Firm-Value Effects of CSR Disclosure and CSR
Performance (Oct. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (suggesting that investors overvalue
CSR disclosures relative to CSR performance, apparently because of difficulty interpreting
CSR
disclosures,
which
are
susceptible
to
management
manipulation),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2821691 [https://perma.cc/84RE-ZDR2].
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1985 (11th Cir.
2011).
175. See Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 885 (1990).
176. Fisch, supra note 71, at 845.
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systems when all of its competitors do, investors are almost certain to demand
reforms. Current conceptions of loss causation and damages fail to recognize
shareholders’ contributions to corporate value and thereby further impede the
use of section 10(b) to enforce disclosure standards intended to empower
shareholders as participants in governance.
In the context of publicly traded securities, establishing that losses were
caused by fraud is a uniquely complex problem. These securities have
established market prices, and, even if that price is too high (because it is
inflated by fraud) any investor who purchases at that price has not
In Dura
experienced an economic loss until the price drops.177
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,178 the Supreme Court held that a price drop,
without more, is not sufficient to establish the element of loss causation;
instead, the drop must be caused by the removal of the original artificial
inflation.179 Drops caused by intervening events, such as an unrelated
economic disruption, have not been caused by the fraud and cannot form the
basis of a section 10(b) claim.180 So long as the market remains fooled, the
investor has not been harmed specifically by the fraud itself.
The difficulty with this standard is that there is great uncertainty as to what
it means for a loss to be “caused” by artificial inflation leaving the stock.181
Currently, there are two approaches, although the application of the rules can
vary widely. Some courts have defined loss causation very narrowly, holding
that the element is satisfied only if there is a price drop in response to a
“corrective disclosure”—meaning that the specific statement that misled the
market must be shown to have been false and the market must adjust to
account for the correction.182 Other courts find that the element is satisfied
if losses represent the “materialization of the risk” that the fraud itself
concealed, even if the market is not at that time made aware of an earlier
lie.183 For example, a company may suddenly announce a liquidity crisis,
causing a stock price drop, without disclosing that the crisis was the natural
culmination of prior fraudulent financial statements.184 While there may not
be any loss causation under the corrective disclosure standard, loss causation
exists under the materialization of risk standard because the crisis is the result
of a concealed risk—financial failure—that materialized.
Conceptually, losses that result from materialization of the risk go beyond
the difference between the purchase price at the time of the original lie and
177. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005).
178. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
179. Id. at 341–43.
180. Id.
181. Scholars have also identified basic conceptual problems with this approach: namely,
if a fraud affects a calculation of the probabilities regarding a loss, then any misrepresentation
of those probabilities, which ultimately makes loss more likely, inflicts economic harm. Fisch,
supra note 71, at 854 (“The economic significance of the lie is in how it relates to the known
risks at the time of investment, not the extent to which those risks materialize and result in
harm. In a sense, the plaintiff’s injury is akin to a failure to get true odds in a bet.”).
182. See, e.g., Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 230 (5th Cir.
2009).
183. See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005).
184. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 278, 306–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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the security’s true value at that time. In most cases, these losses represent a
worsening of the original problem. For example, suppose a company has a
pending new drug application with the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). The probability of a denial is 80 percent, but the company tells
investors that the probability is 10 percent. The stock price is artificially
inflated. When the FDA denies the application, the risk has materialized, but
now the probability of a denial is 100 percent. The FDA’s action will
therefore cause the stock price to fall further than it would have had the
company told the truth in the first place.185
These kinds of losses are, in a sense, governance losses—they are not
merely the result of the original artificial inflation leaving the stock, but are
also the consequence of managers’ substantive choices in running the
company. Some losses may simply represent the worsening of a problem
management sought to conceal, as in the FDA example, and some may even
represent an aggravation of the problem caused by the cover-up, such as when
a company makes ill-advised business moves in an effort to disguise an
earlier accounting fraud.186 Either way, they do not represent the impact of
the lie alone; they additionally represent the damage to the company wrought
by managerial decision-making.
The corrective disclosure standard has several problems, including that it
misapprehends how information affects stock prices. A lie is a piece of
information that investors use to value the stock. If newer, more accurate
information later comes to light via materialization of the risk concealed by
the lie (such as the FDA’s denial of the drug application), the lie itself
becomes irrelevant and its effects dissipate while investors update their
information.187 Requiring an explicit corrective disclosure makes little
economic sense and, worse, allows corporations to evade liability by
strategically timing their communications.188
But the corrective disclosure standard is striking for a second reason: it
represents a refusal to recognize interference with shareholders’ governance
rights as a cognizable section 10(b) harm. The theory behind ESG
disclosures is that dysfunctional behavior will not persist because shareholder
185. Cornell & Morgan, supra note 175, at 889–891; Fisch, supra note 71, at 849.
186. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887,
1910 (2013).
187. Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation:
Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1442
(2004).
188. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 71, at 851–52; Barbara A. Bliss et al., Information
Bundling and Securities Litigation 2 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 16-219,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795164 [https://perma.cc/F662V33Q] (finding that corporations “bundle” the release of information to impede plaintiffs’
ability to detect the impact of corrective information). The problem also arises in the context
of class certification. Some courts have accepted the argument that a false statement’s impact
on stock price can be divined by determining whether disclosure of truth resulted in stock price
drop. See, e.g., Burges v. Bancorpsouth, No. 3:14-cv-1564, 2017 WL 2772122, at *10 (M.D.
Tenn. June 26, 2017); Willis v. Big Lots, No. 2:12-cv-604, 2017 WL 1063479, at *16 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 17, 2017). This inquiry, which is facially similar to the search for a corrective
disclosure for loss causation purposes, suffers from the same flaws.
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pressure will force a correction. When corporations issue false information,
they deny shareholders this opportunity, allowing managerial mistakes to
snowball and inflict further damage on the company. And when courts refuse
to recognize these losses, there is no value placed on shareholders’ ability to
influence corporate policy.
This orientation is rendered even more stark by the standard definition of
section 10(b) damages. Most courts hold that section 10(b) usually permits
only “out-of-pocket” damages, defined as the difference between the price
paid for the security and its true value at the time of purchase.189 Any further
decrease in value that occurs after the purchase is not recoverable.190 To
ascertain the value that the security would have commanded at the outset,
plaintiffs typically look to the price of the security when the truth is disclosed
and the artificial inflation has been removed, and work from a baseline
assumption that this price represents the stock’s true value.191 They then
calculate backward to determine the amount of artificial inflation that had
been in the stock at various points in time since the fraud began.192
Plaintiffs additionally have the burden of segmenting out intervening
events that may also have pulled down the price of the stock.193 These
intervening events might be entirely unrelated phenomena, but they might
also represent materializations of the original risk if the risk grew larger over
time. For example, in In re Vivendi, S.A. Securities Litigation,194 concealed
liquidity problems worsened over the course of a long class period, and
investors who bought at earlier points, when the situation was not as dire,
were not entitled to damages resulting from the company’s subsequent
decline in fortunes.195 Because many cases are like Vivendi in that the
problem worsens before the fraud becomes known and the artificial inflation
is eliminated from the stock,196 the standard damages measure does not allow
investors to recover for poor governance concealed and enabled by the fraud.
Indeed, some theorists have argued that because any stock price decline
associated with a disclosure of the fraud also represents losses due to
shareholders’ new doubts in management’s abilities, these too should be
segmented out and treated as unrecoverable.197
This issue was on sharp display recently in Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C.198 The
plaintiffs alleged that BP falsely described the adequacy of its safety

189. See, e.g., Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 2015).
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir.
2015).
192. Id. at 415–16.
193. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 254 (2d Cir. 2016).
194. 838 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2016).
195. Id. at 255.
196. See, e.g., Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (finding that the loan quality allegedly worsened over the class period).
197. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 BUS. LAW.
163, 181 (2007).
198. 800 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2015).
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protocols.199 The truth was not revealed, however, until Deepwater Horizon
exploded, sending thousands of barrels of oil gushing into the Gulf of Mexico
every day for months on end.200 Naturally, the disaster sent BP’s stock price
tumbling, far beyond the amount of artificial inflation that had been
introduced into the stock as a result of the lie.201 Or, to put it another way,
had BP confessed to the abysmal state of its safety systems at the outset, its
stock price surely would have dropped but not to the dramatic degree that
occurred once the risk created by the deficient safety protocols
materialized.202
The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could only collect damages that
represented the amount they overpaid for the stock, namely, the portion of
the drop attributable solely to the misstatements.203 According to the court,
any damages due to materialization of risk, management’s poor governance,
or new doubts about management’s abilities, were not part of the fraud itself
because they did not represent the inflated purchase price that resulted from
the lie, and therefore were not recoverable under section 10(b).204
Governance damages, the court presumed, were more properly the subject of
a state law claim for fiduciary breach.205
This reasoning, of course, assumed that had the truth been disclosed, the
stock would have been repriced to account for the newly increased risk of a
disaster. Investors who bought at the new, lower price would be deemed to
have accepted all of BP’s reported profits and benefits at that time.206 Yet
this counterfactual was never a possibility because BP could not have simply
confessed to the truth and remained at the status quo. Had BP admitted the
deficiencies in its safety protocols, investors—not to mention regulators—
would have demanded their correction, thus rapidly diminishing (if not
eliminating) the likelihood of a disaster of that magnitude. Disclosure would
have functioned to correct the underlying substantive problem.207 Thus, the
fraud did not simply conceal a risk that would have been factored into the
price had it been disclosed: it denied shareholders the opportunity to improve
the risk profile of the company. But these damages are entirely unrecognized
by the out-of-pocket damages measure.208
199. See id. at 678–79.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 680.
202. See id. at 689.
203. Id. at 690.
204. Id. at 690–91.
205. See id.
206. Id. at 690.
207. One study has documented how direct shareholder engagement regarding ESG can
lower the firm’s risk profile. See generally Andreas Hoepner et al., ESG Shareholder
Engagement and Downside Risk (Nov. 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874252 [https://perma.cc/75Z6-PP24].
208. This is because, by definition, they paid the “right” price at the time of purchase due
to the fact that the artificial inflation (and thus damages) were only introduced later. Even if
damages for such investors were measured at the time of the fraudulent statement that induced
them to hold, the counterfactual scenario presumably would be a public announcement of the
truth. Such an announcement would have caused a price decline and losses to the holder
regardless of the fraud. The only losses a holder experiences as a result of the fraud itself are
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The out-of-pocket damages rule places an additional burden on ESGrelated claims because soft information, such as risk disclosures and
sustainability reports, is the hardest to value ex ante, and thus the most
difficult to separate from intervening causes ex post. In BP, shareholders
were unable to model the value of the safety misstatements standing alone,
causing the court to dismiss their claims.209 Thus, the standard both
substantively and procedurally devalues ESG disclosures.210
Courts’ tendency to discount governance-related disclosures is particularly
notable in cases like Meyer v. Greene.211 In Greene, the company
experienced a significant stock price drop after the announcement of an SEC
investigation into the defendant’s accounting practices.212 The plaintiffs
alleged that the announcement represented a corrective disclosure.213 The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that
the commencement of an SEC investigation, without more, is insufficient
to constitute a corrective disclosure for purposes of § 10(b). The
announcement of an investigation reveals just that—an investigation—and
nothing more. To be sure, stock prices may fall upon the announcement of
an SEC investigation, but that is because the investigation can be seen to
portend an added risk of future corrective action. That does not mean that
the investigations, in and of themselves, reveal to the market that a
company’s previous statements were false or fraudulent.214

Similarly, in Loos v. Immersion Corp.,215 the Ninth Circuit held:
The announcement of an investigation does not “reveal” fraudulent
practices to the market. Indeed, at the moment an investigation is
announced, the market cannot possibly know what the investigation will
ultimately reveal. While the disclosure of an investigation is certainly an
ominous event, it simply puts investors on notice of a potential future
disclosure of fraudulent conduct. Consequently, any decline in a
corporation’s share price following the announcement of an investigation
can only be attributed to market speculation about whether fraud has
occurred. This type of speculation cannot form the basis of a viable loss
causation theory.216

The court’s language is telling: changes to the risk profile of a security
due to uncertainty about management misconduct is not a cognizable loss for
section 10(b) purposes. Clearly, other types of changes to a stock’s risk
profile, such as an increased risk of an environmental disaster, have value,
but when the change in risk is specifically due to concerns about management
the further declines in value that occur after the fraudulent statement that induces the investor
to refuse to sell. These are precisely the damages that go unrecognized by the out-of-pocket
damages measure.
209. BP, 800 F.3d at 690.
210. Notably, even when these issues are not directly litigated, they influence settlement
discussions and reduce plaintiffs’ recovery. See Bliss et al., supra note 188, at 30.
211. 710 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2013).
212. Id. at 1193, 1197.
213. Id.
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. 762 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 2014).
216. Id. at 890.
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truthfulness and quality, courts refuse to recognize a loss, at least so long as
the investigation does not result in a finding of wrongdoing.217 Such holdings
legally mandate that shareholders not place any value on the increased risk
of problematic governance, thus implicitly denying shareholders a
governance role and contradicting explicit congressional policy. Indeed, the
very purpose of certain mandated disclosures, such as certifications requiring
a corporation’s chief executive officer to attest to the adequacy of internal
controls and the accuracy of corporate disclosures,218 is to bolster investor
confidence in corporate governance quality, which is then expected to assist
with market valuation.219 When courts disparage the importance of investor
confidence, they impede the achievement of these federal goals.
Once again, many of these problems can be attributed to the functional
elimination of the reliance requirement. BP is once again instructive. There,
the Fifth Circuit held that its measure of cognizable damages—the decrease
in the stock’s price attributable solely to the dissipation of artificial inflation,
without consideration of damages due to mismanagement—could be
confined solely to cases brought under a fraud-on-the-market theory.220 If an
investor actually relied on the misstatements, the investor could recover the
damages resulting from the materialization of the risk.221 The court’s
reasoning was that the market price represents an average judgment of the
value of the stock given various risks, but some investors may have different
risk tolerances than the market as a whole.222 Whereas the rest of the market
might be willing to assign a particular ex ante numeric value to the risk of a
disastrous explosion—one that was distorted to some degree by BP’s false
statements—other investors may simply have been unwilling to tolerate that
risk.223 Had the truth been disclosed, these investors would not have bought
at all.224 They would therefore be entitled to recover for the “consequential”
damages of the explosion because they could show that they had been forced
to assume a specific risk they never intended to accept.225 Investors who
accepted the market judgment did not avoid any particular risk, but instead

217. The Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 511–14 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that a director’s resignation due to
concerns about corporate accounting did not, without more, satisfy the element of loss
causation).
218. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-14 (2016).
219. Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any successful section 10(b) claim that would not
also involve the falsity of the internal controls representations (because either the internal
controls failed or the CEO ignored the information they provided). Therefore, the portion of
section 10(b) losses attributable to defective governance is always, in some sense, tied to at
least one false representation: the false representation of governance quality contained in the
internal control certifications. See Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities
Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 169, 178 (2010).
220. Ludlow v. BP, P.L.C., 800 F.3d 674, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2015).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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agreed to pay a certain price for a general risk profile, entitling them only to
the price revision associated with the true, concealed risk profile.226
This reasoning does not go so far as to acknowledge the value that
shareholders add to a company when permitted to exercise their governance
powers, but it does illustrate that the functional elimination of the reliance
requirement encourages courts to discount how shareholders individually
interact with the companies in which they invest. Moreover, the Fifth
Circuit’s view has a certain appeal when viewed through a governance lens.
After all, shareholders who do not directly rely on corporate statements
cannot be said to have used them when making decisions about participation.
And shareholders who involve themselves in governance only after a
purchase—such as investors who buy on an index—do not use the
governance disclosures for their purchasing decisions. Returning to Blue
Chip, these shareholders have not experienced a harm to their governance
rights in their specific capacity as a purchaser or seller.
At the same time, however, these purchasers, like all investors, expect that
they are buying into a particular governance structure and price the securities
accordingly. That structure includes the disciplining voice of investors,
which is then baked into the valuation. When that voice is denied, even
shareholders who did not individually rely on the misstatements at the
moment of purchase experience the harm. That said, the Fifth Circuit’s
distinction between actual reliance and fraud-on-the-market reliance is a
useful starting point for addressing false governance disclosure under section
10(b).227
3. Omissions Liability
The controversial issue of omissions liability further illustrates courts’
discomfort with the use of disclosure standards as a mechanism for involving
shareholders in governance.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b) forbid both false statements and
misleading omissions, which are defined generally as “half-truths” that leave
investors with false impressions of fact.228 Silence, the Supreme Court has
226. The Fifth Circuit’s view is in line with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that damages for misrepresentation include both the amount of overpayment and the
“pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the recipient’s reliance upon the
misrepresentation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); cf. Fisch,
supra note 71, at 870 (recognizing uncertainty as to how damages should be calculated in
actual reliance claims). To be sure, courts used the out-of-pocket damages measure for section
10(b) claims even before the Supreme Court’s endorsement of fraud-on-the-market theory in
1988, but it is only in more recent years that courts have made vigorous efforts to distinguish
between the inflated purchase price and damages caused by worsening underlying conditions.
See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968) (“It is not until the existence of
the fraudulent conduct is known that the true value of the securities as an investment can be
ascertained.”). Esplin is cited in a leading pre-Dura Pharmacy treatise. See ALAN R.
BROMBERG, 2 SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 9.1 (1971).
227. See infra Part V.A.2.
228. In re Vivendi, S.A. Sec. Litig., 838 F.3d 223, 239–240 (2d Cir. 2016); Berson v.
Applied Signal Tech., Inc., 527 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[A] statement is misleading if
it would give a reasonable investor the ‘impression of a state of affairs that differs in a material
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held, is not misleading “absent a duty to disclose.”229 The question for courts
has therefore been whether the SEC’s regulatory disclosure requirements
create a “duty to disclose” such that the failure to speak qualifies as a
misleading omission.230 If so, this would begin to close the enforcement gap
that the puffery doctrine has opened and grant shareholders broad powers to
require disclosure of governance-related information. This is particularly so
because different disclosure requirements apply to different types of
corporate filings, and the blanket application of section 10(b) to omissions
glosses over these distinctions.
For example, SEC regulations require that proxy solicitations include a
variety of governance-related disclosures, such as whether compensation
policies encourage risk-taking231 and the existence of prior reporting
violations.232 Some courts have interpreted section 14 to contain vigorous
affirmative disclosure requirements for proxy solicitations.233 Yet Rule 14a9, the only cause of action available to investors for deficient proxy
disclosures,234 has been interpreted very narrowly.235 If section 10(b) can be
used for omissions as well as misstatements, the omission of information
from a proxy statement can be bootstrapped on to a 10(b) claim regardless of
Rule 14a-9’s limitations. Similarly, companies have a bevy of affirmative
disclosure requirements associated with the issuance of new securities,
including the required disclosure of any material information that has not yet
been reported.236 Although a narrow cause of action exists for investors who
purchase securities pursuant to a defective registration statement,237 if section
10(b) applies to omissions of required information, that cause of action is, in
a sense, extended to the entire marketplace of securities holders.
Section 10(b) would always have allowed liability for false statements in
these documents, but the affirmative disclosure obligations are much broader
and not subject to evasion via the puffery doctrine. Thus, courts examining
omissions claims experience a dilemma similar to that in the puffery context:
failure to disclose required information may well deceive investors who
assume from silence that nothing worth reporting exists, but to impose
liability for omissions based on the mere presumption that the omissions are
deceptive is nearly indistinguishable from imposing liability for
mismanagement alone.
For example, the SEC requires that companies identify “known trends or
uncertainties” that are expected to impact revenues.238 This item instructs
way from the one that actually exists.’” (quoting Brody v. Transitional Hosps. Corp., 280 F.3d
997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002))).
229. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
230. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015); Shaw
v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1221–22 (1st Cir. 1996).
231. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2016).
232. Id. § 229.405.
233. See Mendell v. Greenberg, 927 F.2d 667, 674 (2d Cir. 1990).
234. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
235. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text.
236. See Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S.3) (2017).
237. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
238. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
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issuers to disclose a wide array of potential future events, unless the issuer
determines that the event is “not reasonably likely to occur.”239 In the face
of such obligations, the distinction between imposing liability for silence
about poor managerial decision-making and imposing liability for the
decision-making itself may be “no sharper than that between twilight and
dusk.”240 However, to exempt such requirements from private lawsuits
necessarily leaves a gap in the enforcement regime—one that is
disproportionately likely to affect the types of “soft” governance-related
information that issuers can more easily omit from their filings.
Given this dilemma, it is not surprising that circuits are split as to whether
omissions liability should be permitted at all.241 As of this writing, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the split.242 If the Court
holds that the omission of information can serve as the basis of a fraud-onthe-market section 10(b) claim, lower courts are likely to continue to police
the governance-disclosure distinction by narrowing their interpretations of
corporations’ primary disclosure obligations. Such an outcome would
represent the worst of all worlds: it would directly interfere with federal
efforts to encourage governance disclosures and render the regime
impossible to police by shareholders or even by government authorities.
IV. SHAREHOLDER PREFERENCES AS
IMPOSED BY THE JUDICIARY
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, courts have developed a variety
of tools to distinguish claims rooted in deception from claims rooted in
governance without explicit reference to the element of reliance. These tools,
operating in broad strokes, tend to devalue disclosures designed to empower
shareholders within the corporate form, thus impeding federal efforts to
include shareholders in the governance project.
The consequences go beyond inhibiting shareholders’ ability to minimize
agency costs. As federal law increasingly takes a hands-off approach to
regulation of corporate conduct, many theorists have turned to shareholders
as a potential moderating force that, working within the corporate structure,
can help to police antisocial behavior and curb corporate externalities. But,
as explained below, the judiciary has carved into section 10(b) doctrine a
particular vision of the shareholder as amoral and short-term, with no
interests beyond the maximization of the stock price of the firm at issue.243
Such a portrait is not only factually inaccurate, but stands in opposition to the
239. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835,
Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,961, 43 SEC
Docket 1329, 1335 (May 31, 1989) (emphasis added).
240. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (quoting GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 216 (3d ed. 2007)).
241. Compare Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys. v. SAIC, Inc., 818 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2016), with In re
NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014).
242. SAIC, 818 F.3d 85, cert. granted sub nom., Leidos, Inc. v. Ind. Pub. Ret. Sys., 137 S.
Ct. 1395 (Mar. 27, 2017) (No. 16-581).
243. See infra Part IV.A.
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ethos of modern attempts to enlist stockholders as a moderating force in the
corporate governance structure.
A. Shareholders: Victims or Enablers?
In recent years, there has been a particular disenchantment with direct
government regulation as a mechanism for curbing corporate externalities.244
Corporations that operate internationally may be beyond the power of any
one country to control, the complexity of corporate systems may exceed
regulators’ comprehension, and political gridlock may stifle attempts to adapt
regulations to a changing world.245 The new presidential administration and
Congress have already exhibited a preference for deregulation on the theory
that federal regulation is not only ineffective, but actively anticompetitive
and inimical to growth.246
As a result, some reformers have sought to curb corporate externalities by
manipulating the balance of power within the corporate form itself. In
particular, commentators argue that shareholders, given the appropriate
incentives and powers, can serve as a restraining influence, encouraging
prosocial behavior and discouraging antisocial conduct.247 The assumption
underlying these efforts is that antisocial corporate behavior is a species of
agency cost. Under this view, the dispersed shareholders of a public
corporation are left without power or incentive to monitor their agents
(directors and officers),248 and, as a result, are victimized by corporate
managers who engage in socially irresponsible behavior.
The precise manner in which corporate misbehavior victimizes investors
is articulated in different ways. Sometimes, it is argued that antisocial
conduct is simply a counterproductive way of doing business, resulting in
short-term gains at the expense of longer-term corporate health.249
244. Pargendler, supra note 83, at 365.
245. Id. See generally Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567
(2013); Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry,
35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and
the Decline of Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533 (2015).
246. See, e.g., Nick Timiraos & Andrew Tangel, Donald Trump’s Cabinet Selections
Signal Deregulation Moves Are Coming, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-signal-deregulation-moves-arecoming-1481243006 [https://perma.cc/GL4L-WRRH].
247. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 184–89; Barnali Choudhury, Social
Disclosure, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 216 (2016); Virginia Harper Ho, Risk-Related
Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 651
(2016); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder,
10 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 64 (2005); Pargendler, supra note 83, at 378–96; Gretchen
Morgenson, Want Change?: Shareholders Have a Tool for That, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/business/proxy-climate-change-executive-pay.html
[https://perma.cc/G2RA-PJ29]. The idea dates back at least to the original passage of the
Securities Act when theorists proposed that advisory councils recommend to shareholders how
to vote their shares in the public interest. See Mitchell, supra note 114, at 1545.
248. Technically, directors are not agents of shareholders, in part because shareholders
wield such little power in the corporate structure. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01
cmt. f(2) (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
249. See, e.g., Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 189–90. Various studies purport to show
how attention to externalities, at least along some dimensions, can also lead to greater
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Shareholders, misled as to the nature of the business, overvalue the company
and are harmed when the truth is revealed, the improper conduct halted, and
corporate penalties and fines imposed. Shareholders may also be harmed to
the extent the corporation suffers reputational damage and endures the
expense and disruption associated with legal action, changes in personnel,
and new compliance costs. Particularly egregious conduct may prompt
regulatory responses that further hamper the business.250
Alternatively, shareholders may be harmed in their nonshareholder
capacities, even if the externality-generating behavior benefits the corporate
entity itself. Shareholders who are members of the surrounding community
may be harmed by corporate pollution.251 Shareholder-employees may be
harmed by exploitatively low wages and poor working conditions.252
Shareholder-citizens may be harmed to the extent they object to corporate
practices, such as political donations in favor of causes with which they
disagree or that can work to their detriment.253 Shareholders may also be
harmed in their capacity as investors in other companies. Some shareholders,
for example, invest in a wide variety of companies, and therefore “own[] the
economy.”254 For such investors, the externality-generating conduct of one
company may harm their other investments, ultimately harming their

shareholder returns. See, e.g., Choudhury, supra note 247, at 213; Ho, supra note 247, at 665–
67; Hoepner, supra note 207, at 2 (finding that ESG engagement by shareholders can reduce
firm downside risk).
250. For example, companies that sharply increased the price of generic drugs, while
legally permitted to do so, have become the targets of extraordinary congressional and
prosecutorial scrutiny. See, e.g., David Crow, Valeant Shares Fall 5.6% After U.S. Prosecutors
Announce Fraud Charges, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/952e9f82132b-3aa0-a3c1-4b65fdfb7b37?mhq5j=e1 [https://perma.cc/KCC6-UTKB]; Joseph Walker,
Mylan to Pay $465 Million to Settle Medicaid Claims, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mylan-to-pay-465-million-in-epipen-settlement-1475874312
[https://perma.cc/WKP8-JMPN].
251. Azgad-Tromer, supra note 1, at 179.
252. David H. Webber, The Use and Abuse of Labor’s Capital, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2106,
2149–51 (2014).
253. Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1981).
254. Anabtawi, supra note 109, at 583 (quoting JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T.
WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 21 (2002)); see James Hawley & Andrew
Williams, The Emergence of Universal Owners: Some Implications of Institutional Equity
Ownership, 43 CHALLENGE 43, 45 (2000); Ho, supra note 247, at 673. There is evidence that
large investors vote their shares to maximize wealth across the portfolio rather than to
maximize wealth at particular companies. See, e.g., Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership,
Competition, and Top Management Incentives (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332
[https://perma.cc/XBS4-ZGV3]; Andriy Bodnaruk & Marco Rossi, Dual Ownership, Returns,
and
Voting
in
Mergers
(Feb.
13,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348094
[https://perma.cc/9P88VVJD]; Chris Brooks et al., Institutional Cross-Ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case
of Mergers and Acquisitions (Dec. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747036
[https://perma.cc/ZM7UME58].
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portfolio overall, assuming that the gains to the antisocial corporations are
not symmetric with the harms to others.255
Though these descriptive accounts differ as to the source of the shareholder
harm, they ultimately come to the same conclusion: at least some forms of
antisocial corporate conduct are contrary to shareholders’ interests, and
shareholders, if given sufficient power within the corporate structure, can
serve as a mitigating influence.
That said, these relatively benign views of how shareholders might utilize
enhanced power within the corporate structure are not free from
controversy.256 Many commentators argue that corporate managers simply
respond to market incentives. Shareholders vote for directors—thereby
ratifying their decisions—and reward high profits with high stock prices.
Institutional shareholders must respond to the demands of their beneficiaries
who expect to see immediate short-term increases in the value of their
holdings.257 Diversified shareholders in particular value risk-taking and
reward managers who externalize costs.258 In this model, shareholders
benefit from, and bear a moral responsibility for, harms inflicted by the
corporation on the wider society.259 Risk-taking and lawbreaking are not
255. See, e.g., Barbara Novick, How Index Funds Democratize Investing, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-index-funds-democratize-investing-1483914571
[https://perma.cc/N26H-3G7W] (arguing that BlackRock asset managers would not favor
anticompetitive conduct in the airline industry because however much it might benefit the
airlines it would place additional burdens on virtually all other industries in which BlackRock
invests).
256. See generally Jennifer G. Hill, Images of the Shareholder: Shareholder Power and
Shareholder Powerlessness, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (Jennifer G.
Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (describing how shareholders can alternatively be
characterized as victims of rapacious managers, checks on managerial overreach, or enablers
of misbehavior).
257. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911,
930–36 (2013).
258. See, e.g., John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value,
6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35, 44 (2014); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1267 (1982); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the
Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 138 (2012).
259. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS 75 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1935) (“There is no such thing . . . as an innocent
stockholder. He may be innocent in fact, but socially he cannot be held innocent. He accepts
the benefits of a system. It is his business and his obligation to see that those who represent
him carry out a policy which is consistent with the public welfare.”); see also In re Massey
Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479, at *29 n.185
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2011) (“The primary protection for stockholders against incompetent
management is selecting new directors. It may well be that the corporate law does not make
stockholders whole . . . when it is alleged that corporate managers skirted laws protecting other
constituencies in order to generate higher profits for the stockholders . . . . Remember that to
the extent that Massey kept costs lower and exposed miners and the environment to excess
dangers, Massey’s stockholders enjoyed the short-term benefits in the form of higher profits.
The very reason for laws protecting other constituencies is that those who own businesses
stand to gain more if they can keep the operation’s profits and externalize the costs. Thus, the
stockholders of corporations, especially given the short-term nature of holding periods that
now predominate in our markets, have poor incentives to monitor corporate compliance with
laws protecting society as a whole and may well put strong pressures on corporate
management to produce immediate profits.”).
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agency costs; they are the natural result of corporate managers responding to
the desires of the corporation’s owners.
It is self-evident that shareholders have interests beyond their status as
investors in a particular company and may, therefore, prefer that corporations
not maximize their own wealth if doing so would damage these interests.
Therefore, the above argument frequently is accompanied by the corollary
that when shareholders vote to advance their parochial interests over the
corporate good, other shareholders—and the enterprise itself—will be
exploited.260 This problem has been recognized and accounted for in the
context of controlling shareholders,261 but it may arise even for shareholders
with a minority stake. Union shareholders, for example, may try to extract
concessions for employees,262 employee-shareholders may resist hostile
takeovers,263 hedge funds may advocate for forms of financial engineering
that leech immediate value from the company,264 public pension funds may
encourage firms to engage in political activism,265 and bondholders who also
own stock may use their equity positions to increase the value of their debt
holdings.266 These moves may benefit certain shareholders—and more
broadly, the classes of interests of which they are a part—even as they
damage the corporation as a whole. In other words, the very ESG project is
itself viewed with suspicion because it may enable some shareholders to use
the corporate form to advance their idiosyncratic preferences to the detriment
of other shareholders.
B. A Perfect Storm in Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) represents a perfect storm of conflicted portraits of the role
of the shareholder in corporate governance, where prospective investors are
envisioned as vulnerable to corporate wrongdoing until a purchase is
completed, at which point they immediately become complicit in that
wrongdoing. One the one hand, to the extent shareholders are granted a cause
of action against the entity for the fraud of its agents, shareholders are treated
as victims of the corporation. On the other hand, because damages are paid
by the corporation itself, the costs of the lawsuit are borne by the corporate
entity, and, ultimately, its shareholders—suggesting that shareholders are in
some sense enablers of, or responsible for, the losses.267
260. Anabtawi, supra note 109, at 575–93.
261. See generally Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
262. Anabtawi, supra note 109, at 590.
263. Id. at 587.
264. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Investors, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1290–92 (2008).
265. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800, 803 (1993); Rui A. Albuquerque et al., Public
Pension Funds and Corporate Political Activism 22 (European Corp. Governance Inst.,
Working Paper No. 470/2016, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2572666 [https://perma.cc/4TQ7-E9T9].
266. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 264, at 1288–89; Bodnaruk & Rossi, supra note 254, at
3.
267. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on
Compensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243.
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Neither, of course, is strictly true. Not every prospective investor is a
stranger to the corporate polity. Investors frequently maintain positions in
companies while buying and selling smaller amounts of their holdings. As a
result, investors continuously have one foot in and one foot out. Moreover,
the investor’s purchase simultaneously consummates the fraud (for that
particular investor) and assists in its accomplishment (by pushing prices
higher for other investors).268
Fraud-on-the-market exacerbates these tensions. With the element of
reliance functionally eliminated and the focus on the underlying business
practice rather than the corporate disclosures, the section 10(b) action raises
the specter of awarding damages to shareholders who raised no objection
to—or even implicitly encouraged—the conduct that led to the loss based on
an ex ante calculation that the potential benefits outweighed the risk.
Permitting lawsuits when those problems come to light creates a moral
hazard.269 At the same time, it would be detrimental to the enterprise as a
whole to rigorously enforce a pretense of virtue favored only by a small
minority of investors.
This is what courts are implying when they caution against section 10(b)
becoming a form of “investor insurance.”270 Indeed, courts have explicitly
declared that investors prefer risk and that securities laws should not be used
to stifle that preference, even to the point of suggesting that investors want to
see managers break the law on their behalf.271
Courts examining section 10(b) claims must navigate this dilemma. If
shareholders transform governance disputes into claims ostensibly rooted in
deception, necessarily tasking courts with distinguishing “true” deception
268. James Park theorizes that investors as stockholders have fundamentally different
interests than investors as traders. Stockholders would prefer less disclosure and less stock
price fluctuation, whereas traders would prefer that stocks be accurately valued. See Park,
supra note 22, at 146. The problem with this categorization is that investors are not purely
one or the other. Moreover, pricing and the right of entry and exit have long been
conceptualized as part of the governance structure on which existing stockholders rely. See
supra Part I.
269. See Plumbers Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Ambassador’s Grp., 717 F. Supp.
2d 1170, 1178 (E.D. Wash. 2010).
270. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“[A]llowing
recovery in the face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance would effectively convert Rule
10b-5 into a scheme of investor’s insurance.” (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))); Podany v. Robertson
Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The securities laws are not
intended as investor insurance every time an investment strategy turns out to have been
mistaken.” (citation omitted)).
271. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982); Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761,
777–79 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that bribery payments made in violation of law are never
material so long as there is no self-dealing, and noting that “[t]he objective of business
corporations is to maximize the economic return received by their shareholders; data about a
corporation’s questionable payments is not clearly significant in any economic sense”);
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 328,
330 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (rejecting claim by union shareholders that company failed to disclose
labor law violations in part because their actions may have been “intended for the
corporation’s benefit” (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d. Cir. 1979)));
Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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claims from illusory ones, then courts must pinpoint the degree of corporate
misconduct that shareholders are deemed to expect—and, indeed favor—on
the assumption that shareholders will not rely upon any denials of misconduct
that fall below that level. But when that threshold is breached, corporate
misbehavior is no longer conducted with tacit shareholder approval. Instead,
it stands in opposition to their interests and expectations, marking the point
at which shareholders may be deceived by denials of wrongdoing.
Thus, when it comes to claims based on corporate misconduct and
antisocial behavior, identifying true instances of deception requires courts to
determine what level of corporate misconduct shareholders can be expected
to accept. Essentially, courts must decide the background factual
assumptions that shareholders make about the companies in which they
invest and determine when a deviation from those assumptions reaches the
point of becoming misleading. Courts must police the line between deception
and governance by making a judgment about the kind of unethical behavior
in pursuit of greater profits that is considered unremarkable. And the very
fact of doing so requires courts to take a side in the above debate. That is,
courts must develop a vision of what shareholders value when making an
investment decision. Or, more accurately, courts must develop a vision of
what shareholders will be permitted to value, such that their interests will be
judicially acknowledged.
This is accomplished in the first instance by malleable and inconsistent
approaches to the puffery doctrine. As explained above, puffery is typically
defined as a species of immateriality: certain statements are so hyperbolic or
mundane that investors are unlikely to give them any weight.272 Employing
this definition, courts can dismiss claims that appear to be objections more to
the quality of the underlying governance than to the misstatement itself.
That said, courts have the option of moderating their approach to puffery
when the behavior seems beyond the bounds that even amoral shareholders
would tolerate—namely, by offering a different definition of puffery itself.
For example, in In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Securities Litigation,273
investors alleged that Countrywide Mortgage (a company that later became
notorious for issuing mortgages to unsuitable borrowers) falsely described its
core mortgage operations as sound.274 In a lengthy discussion, the court held:
The federal securities laws do not create liability for poor business
judgment or failed operations. Nor do the laws require public companies
to disclose every change in operations. But the [Complaint’s] allegations
present the extraordinary case where a company’s essential operations
were so at odds with the company’s public statements that many statements
that would not be actionable in the vast majority of cases are rendered
cognizable to the securities laws.
For example, descriptions such as “high quality” are generally not
actionable; they are vague and subjective puffery not capable of being
material as a matter of law. On an individual level, this is because a
272. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text.
273. 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
274. See id. at 1153–56.
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reasonable person would not rely on such descriptions; on a macro scale,
the statements will have little price effect because the market will discount
them. However, the [Complaint] adequately alleges that Countrywide’s
practices so departed from its public statements that even “high quality”
became materially false or misleading; and that to apply the puffery rule to
such allegations would deny that “high quality” has any meaning.275

Here, the court begins by describing puffery as a species of materiality,
such that puffing statements simply cannot affect stock prices, but ends by
altering the definition to be rooted in falsity, theorizing that puffing
statements are ones that are so vague that they could still be truthful for a
wide range of underlying conditions.276 When those conditions are so
extreme as to fall outside the bounds of even broad representations that the
company had adopted a “quality control process” to “improve
consistency,”277 a fraud claim can proceed.278
The switch from a reliance interpretation of puffery to a falsity one is
fraught with governance implications. If one assumes—as most courts do—
that puffing statements are ubiquitous, and if one assumes—as most courts
do, including the Countrywide court—that investors do not take these
statements seriously, then the reinterpretation of puffery suggests that
corporations are free to engage in unethical, risky, or illegal behavior, until
they cross a particularly extreme line, outside the bounds of how shareholders
would ordinarily expect corporations to behave. At that point, it is not so
much the company’s statements, but its business model that acts as a fraud
on shareholders; its mere existence on the market in the guise of a legitimate
investment becomes actionable under section 10(b). And, in fact, some
courts have come close to making this reasoning explicit.279
275. Id. at 1144 (emphasis added).
276. See id.
277. Id. at 1153.
278. Courts routinely adopt similar reasoning. See, e.g., Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Bankrate,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 482, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (stating that “high quality” may be puffery in
some contexts but “is clearly a material misrepresentation when applied to assets that are
entirely worthless”); Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 190 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (finding that statements regarding the quality of risk management cease to become
puffery when “juxtaposed against detailed factual descriptions of the Company’s woefully
inadequate or non-existent credit risk procedures”); In re RAIT Fin. Tr. Sec. Litig., No. 2:07cv-03148-LDD, 2008 WL 5378164, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2008) (noting that although
investors recognize some statements as puffery, “[w]e cannot say that a statement claiming
that RAIT’s ‘credit underwriting involves an extensive due diligence process’ is mere puffery
when Plaintiffs allege that RAIT ‘did not conduct any meaningful ongoing credit analysis
whatsoever’”).
279. Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 312 F.R.D. 307, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that a case
alleging corporate ethical failures was rooted more in its omissions—its failure to
affirmatively confess to the misconduct—than its misstatements about integrity); see also
Bach v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 10-00395-BAJ-RLB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111077, at *35–36
(M.D. La. Aug. 19, 2016) (“The Court acknowledges that Plaintiffs have not, in every instance,
identified which ‘particular statements are false or misleading. But the reason for this is
relatively simple: most of Plaintiffs’ falsity allegations are centered around the major
allegation that Defendants failed to disclose and omitted certain material information
[regarding illegal conduct] from the second quarter of 2005 through the second quarter of
2010 . . . .’ ‘Amedisys’s decision to withhold that information therefore constitutes a material
misrepresentation within the meaning of Rule 10b-5.’” (alterations omitted) (first quoting In
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This reasoning further suggests that courts draw a crude line between
antisocial behavior that shareholders are deemed to buy into by virtue of their
participation in the marketplace (antisocial behavior that is conducted on
shareholders’ behalf) and more extreme forms of antisocial behavior that puts
management at odds with shareholders, to the point where shareholders are
no longer the architects of management misconduct, but the victims of it. At
that point, courts can trust that even in the absence of evidence of reliance,
shareholders were, in fact, deceived, so that puffery makes way for a viable
section 10(b) claim.
Omissions liability and loss causation present courts with similar
dilemmas. In both situations, courts must engage with a hypothetical
alternative world in which the truth had been disclosed and determine how
shareholders would have reacted. Courts must gauge whether shareholders
expected or encouraged the concealed (and presumably, negative)
behavior—and they may conclude that they did. For example, in several
cases involving for-profit colleges, shareholders alleged that the defendants
failed to disclose unethical or illegal recruiting methods and students’
inability to pay tuition.280 Courts responded by suggesting that the omitted
tactics were ones that investors should have expected given the nature of the
industry—or even that investors should have favored them.281 One case held
that statements inflating the quality of education provided might be sufficient
for an enrollee to bring a fraud claim, but as to investors constituted
puffery—presumably because stockholders would have no interest in (or
perhaps would even expect) the exploitation of students.282 Other courts
have simply imposed special burdens on claims regarding ethical conduct:
such claims may proceed, but only if the defendant explicitly attributes its

re ArthroCare Corp. Sec. Litig., 726 F. Supp. 2d 696, 710 (W.D. Tex. 2010); then quoting
Basic Inc., v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988))).
280. See, e.g., Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Apollo Grp. Inc., 774 F.3d 598, 600 (9th Cir.
2014) (finding that shareholders should have expected the recruitment of students unable to
pay tuition); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Capella Educ. Co., 873 F. Supp. 2d
1070, 1079 (D. Minn. 2012) (“[E]ven accepting Plaintiff’s allegations that [defendant’s
recruiting] practices were overly aggressive and abusive, there is no plausible theory that
Defendants’ actions, had they been timely disclosed, would have made a difference with
respect to investors’ decisions.”); In re ITT Educ. Servs., 859 F. Supp. 2d 572, 581 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (holding that statements that overstated the schools’ criteria for admitting students were
immaterial because “selectivity is not necessarily positively correlated with profitably, in fact,
the opposite may be true”).
281. See supra note 280.
282. In re ITT, 859 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (noting that even if false statements about outcomefocused education “might establish a strong claim for a dissatisfied student to bring against
ESI[,] . . . the alleged misleading statements, when made to investors, amount to typical
corporate puffery, and as such, they are not actionable under the securities laws”). Similar
holdings arose out of claims associated with the financial crisis. For example, false statements
by ratings agencies that they were independent of the securities issuers were deemed to be
material to investors in the rated securities but puffery to investors in the ratings agencies
themselves. Compare United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV 13-0779 DOC(JCGx),
2013 WL 3762259, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013), with Boca Raton Firefighters & Police
Pension Fund v. Bahash, 506 F. App’x 32, 35 (2d Cir. 2012).
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financial success to its ethics.283 Once again, these holdings create a
doctrinal principle that investors only concern themselves with ethics in
certain narrow circumstances, typically tied to short-term financial gain.
Courts use the definition of scienter to similar effect. Section 10(b) only
prohibits intentional or reckless conduct,284 but courts offer varying
explanations as to what precisely the defendant must intend or be recklessly
indifferent about. Usually, the defendant must simply intend to mislead
investors, on the theory that section 10(b), and federal law generally, seeks
to protect the accuracy of information used to value securities. Thus, in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson,285 the Supreme Court rejected the defendants’ argument that
their false statements had been intended to protect shareholders.286 It held
that “creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a prodisclosure
legislative philosophy, because complying with the regulation might be ‘bad
for business,’ is a role for Congress, not this Court.”287 In Nakkhumpun v.
Taylor,288 the Tenth Circuit came to a similar conclusion, holding that,
whatever the defendant’s ultimate motive, section 10(b) liability would be
imposed if he intentionally or recklessly misled investors.289
But in other situations, courts reinterpret scienter to mean not merely an
intention to mislead investors but to defraud them. For example, in ECA &
Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust v. JP Morgan Chase Co.,290 the
plaintiff-stockholders of JP Morgan Chase (JPMC) claimed that the bank had
assisted Enron’s fraud by disguising loans to Enron as derivative trades so
that Enron could appear to its own shareholders as having less debt than was
actually the case.291 The fraud was intended to enable Enron to falsify its
own financial statements, but a necessary consequence was that JPMC itself
falsely listed the loans as trades in its own SEC filings.292 When JPMC’s
role in Enron’s fraud was disclosed, its stock price fell, harming its own
shareholders.293 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs
failed to allege scienter against JPMC because they did not
show an intent to defraud JPMC’s shareholders rather than Enron’s
shareholders. . . . Indeed, Plaintiffs have argued that JPMC concealed its
transactions with Enron in return for excessive fees . . . . It seems
implausible to have both an intent to earn excessive fees for the corporation
and also an intent to defraud Plaintiffs by losing vast sums of money.294
283. See, e.g., Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Avon Prods., No. 11 CI 4665, 2014 WL 4832321, at
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2014); In re UBS AG Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2012 WL
4471265, at *36 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012).
284. Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015).
285. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
286. Id. at 239 n.17.
287. Id.
288. 782 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2015).
289. Id. at 1150.
290. 553 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009).
291. Id. at 193–95.
292. Id. at 195–96.
293. Id. at 194.
294. Id. at 203. Other decisions have followed a similar pattern. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local
No. 636 Defined Benefit Plan v. Zale Corp., 499 F. App’x 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2012) (no scienter
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In other words, the Second Circuit modified the definition of scienter to
distinguish between misbehavior done on shareholders’ behalf and
misbehavior that positioned managers as adverse to shareholders. The key
assumption underlying this move is that shareholders welcome attempts to
increase their wealth by any means necessary. The inclination, then, is to
assume that shareholders are short-term wealth seekers to the exclusion of
other concerns. Courts’ unstated assumptions stand in direct opposition to
efforts to utilize shareholders as a disciplining influence on corporate
behavior.
This is not to say that courts reject all claims based on undisclosed
misconduct intended to maximize shareholder wealth; to the contrary, many
such claims succeed.295 The point is that the tools developed to police the
distinction between disclosure and governance can easily be, and often are,
used to inscribe into legal doctrine a conception of shareholders as riskseeking, short-term-wealth maximizing, and amoral—precisely the opposite
of the kind of shareholder who might act to curb antisocial corporate
tendencies.
One irony of this approach is that in courts’ zeal to police the
governance/deception line, they have come close to reviving the now-defunct
“fraud created the market” doctrine. As described above, in the absence of
market efficiency, shareholders generally cannot win the presumption of
reliance that permits them to bring claims on a class basis.296 For a time,
courts accepted “fraud created the market” as an alternative. Under this
theory, regardless of the efficiency of the market, investors are entitled to
presume that publicly traded securities are not so deficient as to be essentially
unmarketable.297 When undisclosed problems reach that level of severity,
the security’s mere existence on the market, masquerading as a legitimate
purchase, works a deception.
The fraud created the market doctrine has been rejected in most modern
decisions,298 but when courts distinguish between shareholder-favored and
alleged against executive who falsified accounting entries because she “acted with the intent
to maintain the good appearance of her department rather than to defraud investors”); Doshi
v. Gen. Cable Corp., No. 2:14-cv-22(WOB-CJS), 2015 WL 366644, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27,
2015) (“Although Sandoval may have been aware of problems and failed to disclose them,
there are no facts to support that he did so with intent to defraud. Instead, the allegations
support an inference that his intent was one shared by most corporate executives: to be
profitable and achieve business goals.”).
295. See, e.g., Pirnik v. Fiat Chrysler Autos., N.V., No. 15-CV-7199(JMF), 2016 WL
5818590, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2016).
296. Occasionally, plaintiffs can obtain a presumption of reliance for claims based on
omissions, rather than affirmative misstatements. See infra Part V.A.3.
297. Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1163 (10th Cir. 2000). In some formulations,
investors are entitled to believe that the regulatory regime and the process involved in bringing
securities to market protect against the sale of completely valueless or unmarketable securities.
See, e.g., T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Okla. Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1333 (10th
Cir. 1983).
298. See, e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120–
21 (2d Cir. 2014); Nuveen Mun. High Income Opportunity Fund v. City of Alameda, 730 F.3d
1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2013); Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751–52 (3d Cir.
2010).
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shareholder-disfavored business models, its spirit lives on. Courts are
reluctant to permit liability for concealed misconduct deemed to be within a
rational, wealth-maximizing investors’ risk tolerance, but when the risks
plainly exceed what any investor would want, investors change status from
enablers to victims. Then, courts functionally will allow fraud claims to be
pursued even in the absence of statements that, in another context, would be
deemed deceptive.
V. REVIVING RELIANCE
Today, disclosure does more work than it has done in the past, and the
private rights of action were not designed for its new role. Yet even within
current doctrinal constraints, efforts to enhance shareholders’ ability to
influence corporate governance are stymied by courts’ distrust of the project.
This distrust is fueled by concerns about the potential for shareholder abuse,
courts’ uncertainties about whether federal law should be regulating
governance, and courts’ judgment that investors are indifferent to externalitygenerating behavior. Courts’ constrained view of deception and damage
threatens to become even more consequential in coming years, as it is likely
the federal government will retrench from command-and-control style
regulation in favor of self-regulation and market constraints. Shareholders
may become an important component of these alternative regulatory
mechanisms and, therefore, their right to participate in corporate governance
deserves a vigorous defense.
A. Distinguishing Between Actual Reliance and
Fraud-on-the-Market Claims
As described above, decades ago, the legal system opted for deterrence
over compensation as a mechanism for enforcing the securities laws.299 In
other words, monetary damages are emphasized as a “stick” that discourages
bad behavior, with only after-the-fact legal fees offered to attorneys as the
“carrot” for bringing the claim. But when shareholders are viewed as part of
the governance structure the compensation rationale takes on additional
importance as a “carrot” to encourage shareholders to shoulder the burdens
of these responsibilities in the first place. It has long been assumed that
shareholders have little reason to monitor corporate managers because they
bear the expenses of doing so but capture only a small portion of the
benefits.300 Institutional investors’ large stakes, coupled with their lower
monitoring costs, may have changed the calculus,301 but the costs have not
been entirely eliminated and surely remain a barrier to participation. Thus,
if shareholders are to participate fully in the corporate enterprise—and serve
as a force to reign in managerial misconduct—it is particularly important that

299. See supra Part I.B.
300. See, e.g., J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund
Regulation, Part II, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799, 834 (2007).
301. See supra Part II.
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the legal system find ways to encourage investor participation and fully
reimburse investors’ losses when they are misled.
Previous commentators have singled out active traders as especially
deserving of compensation in section 10(b) actions, though their particular
recommendations have varied. The basic insight is that active trading
incorporates information into stock prices, which benefits both passive
investors and the economy generally. Active traders who perform this task
take disproportionate risks in the form of lack of diversification. They
therefore are more entitled to damages when corporate information proves to
be false than are passive investors.302 Moreover, to the extent all
shareholders pay when a corporation is forced to fund fraud-on-the-market
damages, it is appropriate that passive investors fund a kind of investor
insurance that is more likely to benefit active investors.303
But actual reliance has a further benefit: it is a precondition for
participating in corporate governance. To the extent shareholders are misled,
they cannot perform their monitoring function. It is therefore appropriate to
enhance remedies to shareholders who take their monitoring role seriously
and—to the extent those payments are funded by the corporate entity—to
indirectly tax the remaining investors for a service that federal law
encourages them to perform. Additionally, imposing a reliance requirement
minimizes the chance that investors who enabled the problem will still be
able to collect “investor insurance” damages when the risks did not pan out.
Following the lead of the Fifth Circuit, the section 10(b) action could be
altered to provide greater rights to investors who can establish actual
reliance.304 These greater rights, described in more detail in the sections that
follow, could then serve as an incentive for institutions both to monitor such
disclosures and to enforce them after the fact.
Courts’ suspicion of section 10(b) claims is at least partly rooted in the
functional elimination of the element of reliance. When reliance is presumed
from surrounding facts, courts must be wary of allowing the presumption on
a hair trigger, particularly given the conflicting incentives facing
shareholders in the context of corporate misconduct. But if investor reliance
is restored as an integral part of the cause of action and must be established
by the plaintiff, courts can be confident that investors were, in fact, deceived,
without the necessity of making value judgments regarding the types of
conduct investors might tacitly encourage.

302. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud
on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 101–02 (2011) (arguing that only active traders should
receive section 10(b) damages); A.C. Pritchard, Halliburton II: A Loser’s History, 10 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 51 (2015) (same).
303. Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 333, 347–50 (noting that holders who cannot recover provide insurance for
the benefits conferred by active traders); James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as
Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 342–44 (2009) (same).
304. In this context, reliance should be interpreted to include investors who outsource
decisions to advisors, who themselves rely on corporate misstatements. Reliance should also
be defined to include computer algorithms that include such statements in trading decisions.

138

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

Importantly, however, these investors should not be required to establish
that they would not have bought at all had they known the truth, or that they
would have bought at a different price, because such a high burden would be
difficult (if not impossible) to meet. Instead, the only inquiry should be
whether the challenged statements factored favorably into their investment
decision. Reliance, under this standard, would operate like a subjective
version of the standard test for materiality. Such a shift would capture the
reality that even when investors cannot identify a single statement as the butfor cause of their purchasing decisions, corporate representations may still
play a role in the investment process. Investors who can make this more
moderate showing are likely to continue to monitor corporate representations
in their capacity as shareholders and engage as necessary when corporate
managers veer into more dangerous territory. If the goal of increased liability
is to reward investors who purchase with the intention to monitor the quality
of governance, requiring investors to demonstrate attention to the relevant
issues is all that should be required.
To be sure, it may be somewhat counterintuitive to rely on active traders
to police governance disclosures because their interests may diverge from
those who buy stock in a particular company and maintain their position.305
Yet the divergence may not be that stark. Even investors who expect to take
a long-term position are likely to periodically buy and sell in accordance with
various investment strategies.306 Thus, despite their status as traders, which
entitles them to damages under Blue Chip,307 they may also maintain an
interest in corporate governance.
Moreover, most institutional investors are intermediaries; they manage
money for beneficiaries, such as retirees. If these institutions disclose their
participation in section 10(b) litigation and any recovery (or better yet, if they
are required to do so),308 investors can determine if they are, in fact,
monitoring corporate management and thereby detect shirking.309
Institutions may improve their own monitoring functions so that they can
demonstrate reliance should the need arise—with the beneficial side effect of
correcting problems before they begin. Indeed, one study found that
particular institutions tend to be “bad” monitors; they end up investing in
more firms targeted for litigation than do other investors, suggesting they are

305. Cf. Park, supra note 22, at 146 (highlighting the divergent interests between
stockholders-as-owners and stockholders-as-traders).
306. See, e.g., Collier v. ModusLink Glob. Sols., Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 61, 74 (D. Mass. 2014).
307. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
308. Currently, that data is not publicly available. In one study, researchers had to contact
settlement administrators to collect it. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 78, at 413.
309. Some have argued that mutual funds have little incentive to monitor management
because the benefits are distributed to all stockholders, including competing funds. See
Fischel, supra note 258, at 1276–77; Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of
Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1824 (2011). Experience
appears to have demonstrated that funds do, in fact, engage in monitoring, see supra Part II,
though perhaps less than they would if they were not mindful of competitors. An “actual
reliance” damage award might allow more vigorous monitors to differentiate themselves from
other funds while partially compensating their costs.
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failing to use the tools at their disposal.310 The incentives provided by these
proposed alterations to section 10(b) doctrine may improve the situation.
That said, one of the barriers to bringing actual reliance claims is that they
cannot be certified for class treatment and the expenses of individual actions
are high.311 Those expenses can be minimized, however, when the individual
action is tied to a class claim, and the individual can utilize discovery
obtained in the class action. Increasingly, institutional investors are choosing
to opt out of class actions and coordinate with the class in hopes that they can
win higher settlements.312 Though these investors frequently rely on the
fraud-on-the-market presumption, many also allege that they actually relied
on the false statements.313 If they knew they could collect additional
damages by claiming actual reliance, more investors would be incentivized
to do so,314 and actual reliance claims would be more feasible.
An even more attractive alternative would be to litigate class actions in the
expectation that some investors may be entitled to receive “actual reliance”
damages. Classes could be certified for specific issues under Rule 23(c)315
so as to allow reliance and damages to be segmented out. Investors who
claim they actually relied on a misstatement could prove that fact in separate
trials, while the remainder of the class would have reliance determined using
a fraud-on-the-market theory. These kinds of flexible procedures are often
employed in complex class actions.316 Because few shareholders are likely
to take advantage of the actual reliance option, and those who do are likely
to have comparatively large stakes, designing class procedures in this manner
would impose minimal additional burdens, while avoiding any frictions that
might arise when investors bring entirely separate actions.317
310. See, e.g., Chishen Wei & Lei Zhang, Identifying Ineffective Monitors from Securities
Class
Action
Lawsuits
2
(Nov.
28,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756247 [https://perma.cc/54F4-T9YJ].
311. Fisch, supra note 71, at 818.
312. Id. at 869–70.
313. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 474, T. Rowe Price Growth Stock Fund v. Valeant Pharm.,
3:16-cv-05034-MAS-LHG (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2016); Complaint ¶ 329, North Sound Capital
LLC v. Merck & Co., 3:13-cv-07240-FLW-DEA (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2013); Complaint ¶¶ 339–
41, British Coal Staff Superannuation Scheme v. AIG, No. 1:12-cv-04555-LTS-DCF
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012).
314. Right now, one of the major potential barriers to opt-out litigation is the statute of
repose. The Supreme Court recently concluded that the repose period will continue to run
after a class action has been filed, thus potentially barring individual litigants from coming
forward later in the process. Cal Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2049
(2017). Though a full discussion of the repose period is outside the scope of this Article, this
doctrine could be modified to permit actual reliance claims to be filed as tagalongs to section
10(b) class actions. Even if it is not modified, presumably investors with potential actual
reliance claims will know that from the outset and can file within the period.
315. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
316. See, e.g., Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2004); Mullen v.
Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 628–29 (5th Cir. 1999); McPhail v. First
Command Fin. Planning, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 514, 519–20 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
317. These procedures might also mitigate any tensions between institutional investors,
who may remain large shareholders, and corporate management. To avoid souring ongoing
relationships, institutions may be reluctant to initiate litigation on their own but be comfortable
simply submitting damages claims in larger class actions with proof of their own reliance.
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A proposed framework for adjusting the section 10(b) cause of action to
distinguish between actual reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims
involves redesigning puffery, loss causation and damages, omissions, and
claims for securities holders. This framework recognizes the value of
governance-related disclosures and investors’ role in the corporate structure.
1. Redesigning Puffery
The puffery doctrine, which disproportionately devalues governancerelated disclosures,318 should be adjusted. There are at least two potential
paths for reform.
First, and most obviously, the doctrine could be entirely eliminated for
investors who allege actual reliance. Courts apply the puffery doctrine with
a special vigor in the context of section 10(b) due to courts’ fear that fraudon-the-market liability could become entirely decoupled from affirmative
disclosures.319 This is simply not a concern for investors who demonstrate
actual reliance on the alleged misstatement.
The shift would not be as dramatic as it sounds. Though materiality—of
which puffery is a facet—is ostensibly defined by reference to an objective,
“reasonable person” standard,320 courts have long been in the habit of tacitly
adjusting their definitions of materiality to match the circumstances of
targeted investors.321 Eliminating the puffery concept entirely when actual
reliance has been established would simply make the practice more explicit.
A broader solution would be to revise the doctrine across the board, even
in fraud-on-the-market cases. It may not be feasible to jettison the doctrine
entirely, for precisely the reasons it was first adopted, but it can be reoriented
to explicitly focus on falsity rather than the presumed immateriality to
investors. Rather than gauging whether the statements are too vague for
shareholders to rely upon—or less logically, whether they are unreliable
because of their similarity to statements issued by comparable companies—
courts should focus on whether the tone of the statement was significantly at
odds with the underlying facts. The focus should be on the nexus between
the statements and the aspect of the business being challenged. Under this
test, general positive statements about the business would not be rendered
false by problems confined to one small segment unless those problems are
extremely severe. The more hyperbolic the language used, the more likely it
would be rendered false by smaller or more confined problems. The balance
would be between the generality of the statement, the tone of the statement,
and the generality and severity of the underlying problem. Courts should be
comfortable employing this analysis because it is quite similar to the test for
318. See supra Part III.A.
319. See supra Part III.A.
320. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013).
321. See Flannery v. SEC, 810 F.3d 1, 11–12 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Litvak, 808
F.3d 160, 182 (2d Cir. 2015); Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case
for Replacing “the Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated Investor” in Inefficient
Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 481 (2006) (concluding that materiality standards should be
altered for inefficient markets).
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materiality generally, which involves a balance of the probability of a
contingent event relative to its magnitude.322
This approach would discourage disappointed investors from using section
10(b) as “investor’s insurance,” while at the same time preventing courts
from making armchair judgments about the significance information might
hold to a hypothetical investor.323 It would also recognize what we
understand intuitively and has been documented by researchers324—that
investors respond to the degree of enthusiasm with which corporate opinions
are expressed. Investors treat mild statements of self-praise differently from
more extreme statements, and a revised puffery doctrine that focuses on the
disparity between the statement and the underlying truth would capture this
reality. For example, claims based on an ethics policy would not be
dismissed merely because the policy was aspirational.325 Instead, courts
would consider whether, given the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing relative
to the business or the knowledge of senior management, the company was
not, in fact, even aspiring to meet the terms of its own policy.326
2. Actual Reliance and Loss Causation
Reformation of the puffery doctrine, however, would not completely
resolve the issue. Loss causation and damages, omissions liability, and Blue
Chip standing requirements continue to block compensation to investors who
misdirect their governance efforts due to false statements or material
omissions. For these elements, taking a page out of the Fifth Circuit’s
playbook in BP, investors who actually relied on the misstatement could
collect “materialization of the risk” damages, incurred as a consequence of
the fraud or the conditions it concealed.327 Such a shift would reward
investors who take an active interest in the quality of the corporate
governance and compensate them for governance-related losses they incur
when their ability to participate is stymied.

322. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). It is also not far removed from
the inquiry courts must undertake when addressing half-truths, namely, a determination of
“what sorts of statements touch closely enough on the [undisclosed facts] to make them
technically true but misleading.” Langevoort, supra note 22, at 459–60.
323. Such determinations typically occur on a motion to dismiss, in the absence of any
record. See Padfield, supra note 138, at 354.
324. See, e.g., Khrystyna Bochkay et al., Hyperbole or Reality?: Investor Response to
Extreme Language in Earnings Conference Calls (Ga. Tech Scheller Coll. of Bus., Working
Paper No. 17-21, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2781784
[https://perma.cc/W4MB-3B34].
325. See, e.g., Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 183
(2d Cir. 2014); Nathanson v. Polycom, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 966, 976–77 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
326. Given the flexible nature of the puffery doctrine, some courts already employ a similar
analysis. See, e.g., Strougo v. Barclays PLC, 105 F. Supp. 3d 330, 345–46 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(rejecting general ethics statements because they were not rendered false by allegedly
improper behavior in one small division); In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ.
1897(HB), 2009 WL 3380621, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009) (“At some point, statements by
a defendant that it ‘generally’ adheres to a particular policy become misleading when in fact
there is no such policy or the policy is something else altogether.”).
327. See supra notes 220–26 and accompanying text.
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Notably, this shift would allow damages to be awarded even for
misstatements that do not impact (or cannot be proved to have impacted) the
security’s price. As described above, part of the theory as to why investors
care about governance is less about stockholder wealth maximization than
the advancement of other values.328 Courts have demonstrated at least some
degree of resistance to recognizing such values legally, and to the extent they
are correct that external concerns do not influence stock prices, investors may
have difficulty using fraud-on-the-market theory to bring claims based on
false corporate pretensions to ethical behavior. If damages are awarded based
on actual reliance, however, it is less important that the market as a whole
take the information into account.
For example, suppose a company makes false statements about a
commitment to diversity in hiring. The statements have little (provable)
impact on price because, as rational wealth maximizers, most shareholders
are uninterested in diversity. Yet some class of investors relies on those
statements. Later, the company reveals the statement to be false when it
announces that it is the target of a class action lawsuit for racial
discrimination and its stock price falls. Under the current section 10(b)
regime, no investor could collect damages because no investor could show
that the price they paid for their shares was higher than its true value at the
time of purchase. But if damages could be awarded to investors who relied
on the false claims, regardless of price impact at the time of the initial lie,
they would be compensated for some of their monitoring costs.329 Such a
regime would further the federal interest in encouraging stockholders to take
an interest in issuers that advance moral causes even when they do not
directly contribute to stockholder wealth.
One point of objection might be that these are governance damages, rooted
in the notion that managers mismanaged the corporation, thus causing losses
to the entity directly and to shareholders indirectly. As such, they already are
remediable in derivative actions under state law. Shareholders may step into
the shoes of the corporate entity and bring claims against faithless managers
on the entity’s behalf, with damages returned to the entity itself.330 Richard
Booth, for example, has argued that many section 10(b) claims should more
properly be characterized as derivative actions.331 Derivative actions,
however, do not recognize the precise harm described here: managerial
misstatements that have the effect of denying shareholders their role in the

328. See supra Part IV.
329. Of course, if there was no price impact, a class action might not be possible, and these
investors would have to determine if the costs of an action were worth the reward without the
ability to tie their claims to fraud-on-the-market class claims. In practice, the choice may not
be as stark. Very often, class plaintiffs bring claims based on a variety of misstatements, some
of which are dismissed as the case progresses. There could easily be situations where a class
action might proceed for one set of statements, while actual reliance claims—based on a subset
of statements related to, but dismissed from, the large class action—proceed in tandem. See
infra Part V.A.3.
330. Schleiff v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 130 A.2d 321, 327 (Del. Ch. 1955).
331. Richard A. Booth, What Counts as Price Impact for Securities Fraud Purposes?, 10
VA. L & BUS. REV. 37, 40 (2015).
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governance structure. The harm is not merely that managers damaged the
company; it is that managers denied shareholders the opportunity for input.
That harm is personal to the investor.
Additionally, plaintiffs may only pursue derivative actions if corporate
directors are operating under a conflict that prevents them from bringing the
claims on the corporation’s behalf.332 This point is central to the notion of a
derivative action: directors are the only rightful governors of the corporation,
and shareholders are permitted a role only in the most extreme circumstances.
The goal under federal law, by contrast, is to encourage shareholders to take
a more active role in the governance structure. And of course, more
practically, if we want to award damages to specific investors to compensate
them for their monitoring activities, that goal is not realized via derivative
actions because damages are paid to the corporate entity.
3. Actual Reliance and Omissions
Actual reliance claims may also be used to adopt a compromise position
on omissions liability under section 10(b). To understand why, it is necessary
to trace the history of the presumption of reliance to the pre-Basic case of
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States.333 There, the Supreme Court held
that when a section 10(b) claim is predicated on a misleading omission rather
than an affirmative false statement, it would be too difficult to expect
investors to prove that they “relied” on missing facts.334 Instead, investors
are entitled to a presumption that omitted material facts would have altered
their investment decision.335 Defendants then have a right to rebut that
presumption.336
Several years later, the Supreme Court decided Basic, after which most
plaintiffs seeking a presumption of reliance chose to utilize fraud-on-themarket rather than omissions liability. However, in cases where an efficient
market was lacking—and therefore Basic was unavailable—plaintiffs often
sought a presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute, leading to many
disputes about whether claims concerned omissions or concerned affirmative
false statements.337
Some courts properly recognized that unless the plaintiff alleges that he or
she actually read the document that omitted the relevant information, the
Affiliated Ute presumption has little force.338 The logic is simple: the
presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute is rebutted if the defendant can
332. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048–49 (Del. 2004).
333. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
334. Id. at 152–53.
335. Id. at 153–54.
336. Id.
337. See, e.g., Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999); Dodona I, LLC
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
338. See, e.g., Eckstein v. Balcor Film Inv’rs., 58 F.3d 1162, 1171 (7th Cir. 1995); Shores
v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151,
1159 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Affiliated Ute presumption is limited to face-to-face
transactions); In re GenesisIntermedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 321, 334 n.16 (D. Minn.
2005) (same).

144

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

show that had the truth been disclosed, the investor would not have behaved
differently. If the plaintiff never read the document, a disclosure could not
have made a difference in the absence of a fraud-on-the-market claim (which,
by hypothesis, is unavailable). Thus, properly understood, Affiliated Ute
should be limited to cases in which the investor actually read and relied upon
the document from which information was omitted, limiting its utility in class
actions.
Omissions claims based purely on failure to comply with SEC disclosure
requirements could be interpreted similarly. Courts could permit such claims
to proceed, but only for investors who demonstrate that they actually relied
on the document that should have, but did not, contain the required
information. Such a compromise, subject to defendants’ right to prove that a
disclosure would not have made a difference, would give courts more
comfort that the claim is rooted in actual deception. At the same time, it
would provide those investors who engage in monitoring activities with
additional incentives. Better yet, corporations that omit information they
previously stated that they would provide—an issue of growing importance
in light of investors’ agitation for increased disclosure—could also incur
liability to relying investors. For maximum effectiveness, under this
approach, if puffing statements continue to be treated as immaterial, courts
should also conclude that puffing statements cannot legally qualify as
adequate disclosures. That is, if there is a requirement that certain
information be disclosed, and the disclosure itself is deemed puffery, the
company should be treated as having omitted required information under
section 10(b), such that investors who actually read the document may pursue
section 10(b) claims under Affiliated Ute.339
4. Claims for Securities Holders
A more dramatic, and controversial, change would be to loosen the Blue
Chip standing requirements for actual reliance claims. Investors would be
able to bring section 10(b) claims if they could show that had the truth been
disclosed, they would have sold their holdings. Such a shift in policy would,
if coupled with “materialization of the risk” damages,340 allow greater
recognition of the right to sell as part of a shareholder’s role in governance
and as a mechanism by which investors discipline managers. For most
institutional investors, proof could likely come in the form of documented
339. Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act imposes liability for false statements
contained in SEC filings and is only available to persons who can prove reliance on the
misstatement. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2012). However, section 18 would not provide an adequate
substitute for the type of liability proposed here. First, it does not, by its terms, provide liability
for omissions. Second, it requires the investor to prove that the misstatement impacted the
security’s price. Third, it only applies to documents filed with the SEC, and many corporate
statements occur outside of SEC filings. Finally, though there is little law on the subject,
courts have assumed that damages are calculated as they would be for section 10(b). See, e.g.,
Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975).
340. Blue Chip operates in tandem with damages limitations; so long as the out-of-pocket
rule applies to damages, investors who merely hold stock would not have a claim. See supra
notes 208–10 and accompanying text.
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investment policies, thus mitigating the concern of the Blue Chip Court that
proof regarding a failure to transact would be too speculative to entertain.341
Moreover, because these claims would only be available in the actual reliance
context, they could not be brought as a class (though, as above, they might
be attached to class claims). This, too, would mitigate the Blue Chip Court’s
concern regarding “vexatious” lawsuits that force settlements with the threat
of large damages.342
B. Imagining a Governance Right of Action
All of these proposals, however, are not a complete fix, in part because
they depend on the presence of an active investor. Passive investing
dominates today, and its market share is growing.343 Passive investors may
well monitor and engage with management after making a purchase, but they
do not make buy and sell decisions based on company-specific information.
Therefore, the most radical potential change would be to allow investors to
bring a claim for deceit if the misstatements influenced their engagement
decisions, preventing them from mitigating (if not eliminating) their losses.
No such claim is permissible under section 10(b), which only prohibits deceit
“in connection with the purchase or sale” of a security.344 A new cause of
action, however, would truly demonstrate federal law’s commitment to
giving shareholders a voice in corporate governance.
If a new statutory cause of action were crafted, it could require proof of
direct reliance by the individual shareholder, but loosen the tight causation
requirements of Rule 14a-9 and expand beyond misstatements in proxy
solicitations.345 This way, passive investors, who cannot establish actual
reliance in connection with a purchase or sale, could collect damages for
interference with their governance rights, partly compensating them for their
efforts on behalf of all investors.
As with all claims rooted in actual reliance, one of the biggest stumbling
blocks would be the expenses associated with the action in the absence of the
potential for class certification. But once again, if the particular claim is also
associated with a fraud-on-the-market section 10(b) action, the litigation
could be coordinated to minimize expenses. Moreover, if the passive
investors have large enough holdings, simple joinder with other investors,
each of whom proves reliance individually, might be sufficient to make the
actions cost efficient.

341. This claim, intended to encourage investors to correct corporate malfeasance, would
be unavailable for the admittedly rare cases where management is alleged to have low-balled
the stock in order to discourage purchases as the original Blue Chip plaintiffs alleged. That
way, at least some of the concern of the Blue Chip Court—that proof would be hard to come
by—would be mitigated. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754 (1975).
342. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 739–41.
343. See Sarah Krouse & Corrie Driebusch, Investors Snub Money Managers for Market
Clones, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/morningstar-says-activelymanaged-mutual-funds-saw-outflows-in-2015-1452701873 [https://perma.cc/HP6F-W5UN].
344. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
345. See supra Part III.
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Looking further down the road, we might also begin to consider a scheme
where disclosure violations are penalized more heavily in firms that minimize
shareholder governance rights (dual class stock, staggered boards, and so
forth) on the theory that if shareholders have fewer levers of power, it is less
appropriate to characterize them as enablers. For example, Snap—the parent
of Snapchat—recently held an initial public offering of stock that offers no
voting rights.346 Investors in such companies must rely on buying, selling,
and suing, to discipline management, making disclosures ever more critical.
Moreover, where shareholders’ power is minimized, they are less responsible
for corporate misbehavior, and courts need not harbor the same concerns that
they may have tacitly encouraged it. Thus, for such companies, ESG
disclosures attesting to management quality and ethics could be treated as
having particular importance, and puffery-like arguments could be especially
disfavored.347
CONCLUSION
The more that the federal government retreats from substantive regulation
of corporate behavior, the greater the potential for shareholders to fill the
void. It is far from ideal that shareholders—whose interests may differ from
the broader society348—should occupy that role, but it may be the most viable
near-term option. Still, shareholders cannot fulfill that responsibility if the
disclosures they rely upon are underenforced by courts relying on outdated
distinctions between valuation and governance. Long term, the solution may
be to develop causes of action that are more specifically tailored to deception
that influences how shareholders behave as corporate constituents. Until
then, there are potential changes to section 10(b) doctrine that can correct the
problem and provide better support for federal policy, while still maintaining
section 10(b)’s essential character as a claim rooted in deception.
At least part of the problem for courts stems from the practical elimination
of the reliance element from section 10(b) claims. Without evidence of the
actual reliance of particular investors, courts are forced to draw broad
conclusions about information that investors may have relied upon, leading
to rules of thumb designed to differentiate investors who were truly
defrauded from those who are the architects of their own misfortune.
Unfortunately, these rules encourage courts to paint a doctrinal portrait of a
ruthlessly short-term wealth-maximizing shareholder that is, or appears to be,

346. See Maureen Farrell, In Snap IPO, New Investors to Get Zero Votes, While Founders
Keep Control, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-snap-ipo-newinvestors-to-get-zero-votes-while-founders-keep-control-1484568034
[https://perma.cc/3KJQ-KFMY].
347. Cf. Ian Appel, Governance by Litigation 17–18 (June 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532278
[https://perma.cc/2X7RXT7T] (finding that when investor litigation rights are diminished at the state level, firms
perform more poorly, and that the effect is especially pronounced when investors have fewer
alternative mechanisms for disciplining management).
348. Thomas W. Joo, Comment, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word,” 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1579, 1587–88 (2006).
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at odds with many investor preferences and the project of enlisting
shareholders as a restraining influence on corporate excess.
There are legitimate reasons for softening the reliance requirement for
open-market frauds, but the protective measures that have built up around
that doctrinal shift are not necessary—and are in fact counterproductive—in
certain contexts. Moreover, the rise of institutional investors has made actual
reliance claims more feasible, particularly when they can be tied to pending
class actions. Therefore, a solution that narrows situations in which
statements are found to be immaterial as a matter of law, and that
distinguishes between actual reliance claims and fraud-on-the-market claims,
can better encourage investor monitoring and better enable investors to
protect their interests.

